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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Communications and Cybersecuri-
ty at the International Hellenic University. This dissertation begins with an analysis 
about the Mobile Ad Hoc Networks and their possible applications in everyday life. 
Moreover, an analysis of the TCP/ IP protocol stack used in MANETs is included, 
which is similar to the implementation of WLANs. Possible attacks against MANETs 
and Intrusion Detection System approaches that mitigate misbehavior are mentioned 
along with a review between three IDS approaches.  
This field is still in research and requires further improvements to provide secure and 
quality applications taking into consideration that the technology is new and yet, possi-
ble attacks may not have been discovered. We may not have included the best approach 
in this dissertation, but through the theoretical analysis and review of the three ap-
proaches, the required knowledge about IDS for MANETs can be attained together with 
knowledge on how to choose a more effective and efficient approach.  
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Dimitris Baltatzis, for the guidance and advice 
he has provided in each step to complete my dissertation and through my time as his 
student at the International Hellenic University. 
 
Dimitrios Spanos 
18-12-2017 
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1 Introduction 
Tetherless technology is rapidly emerging in recent years together with the proliferation 
of the mobile devices that require interconnection. The goal of this dissertation is to 
identify the characteristics and vulnerabilities on Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) 
and to find an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) approach that best suits such networks. 
Taking into consideration the characteristics and uniqueness of these wireless networks 
to apply an effective IDS that is also not high resource consuming is a challenge. Due to 
the nature of MANETs, they are more susceptible to attacks than Wireless LANs or 
wired networks and this being the reason, the security of these networks is researched 
over the past years. A quick review of the vulnerabilities and possible attacks against 
MANETs, either passive or active, is presented in the 4th chapter of this dissertation.   
There are significant differences between MANETs and WLANs, however, the TCP/IP 
protocol stack used for both technologies is similar. That is to say, MANETs use the 
same IEEE 802.11 protocols as WLANs, which are detailed in the 3rd chapter. The 
TCP/IP protocol stack is widely used even though other protocols that are designed es-
pecially for MANETs exist. The reason is that it allows different systems to interoper-
ate. Nevertheless, the main difference is that MANETs are infrastructureless networks 
with the capability to interconnect to other networks with fixed infrastructure, while 
WLANs are Access Point (AP) based networks. Furthermore, MANETs use a multi-
hopping topology to relay packets from source to destination, while WLANs just use 1-
hop links from the AP to the connected devices. Thus, MANETs require cooperation 
between the network’s nodes to operate. 
MANETs were initially proposed for military applications, but they can actually be use-
ful for civilian applications. They can be used for conferences, search and rescue opera-
tions or as an extension to wired networks in areas where there is no infrastructure 
available. MANETs are dynamic and temporary networks that allow rapid deployment 
at low cost and this is the reason of their success. Applications will be further discussed 
in chapter 2 together with the constraints and the characteristics. The most important of 
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them are the lack of centralized control, mobility, unreliable communication, limited 
power storage, memory, processing and bandwidth. 
The devices used are small and lightweight in order to be easily transported, such as 
PDAs, cell phones, sensors, etc. Nodes have the ability to move at will inside the net-
work, which causes link breaks and packet losses. The network layer is responsible to 
construct routes and maintain the connectivity between the nodes. Therefore, the net-
work layer is far more researched than the other layers of the protocol stack and it will 
be analyzed in the 3rd chapter. The main approaches of topology based routing are pro-
active and reactive. Proactive approach maintains up-to-date routing tables in each node 
for every other node in the network to be able to forward a packet, while the reactive 
approach creates a route only when it is requested to forward a packet and afterwards 
the route is deleted. There are more routing approaches like position based, energy 
aware and quality of service, which forward a packet to the destination depending on 
other metrics. Some of the protocols proposed in the literature will be further discussed, 
while mainly focusing on the topology based approaches.   
The topology based architectures are either flat or hierarchical, which groups the nodes 
into clusters. A flat architecture means that all the nodes of a network have equal re-
sponsibilities, on the other hand, in a hierarchical architecture, the nodes have three dif-
ferent roles. They can become either a clusterhead being the cluster leader, a gateway 
node or a simple member node. The clusterhead manages the mobility and resource al-
location inside its cluster and the gateway is the connection link between different clus-
terheads. The hierarchical approach is generally preferred for large networks, but should 
be avoided in smaller networks because it is more complex. 
In the 6th chapter, we will have an analysis on three IDS approaches, which use either 
flat or hierarchical architectures. An IDS, however, is a reactive mechanism that can be 
complemented by a preventive mechanism like encryption or authentication to raise the 
security level. Nevertheless, maintaining both mechanisms activated all the time is not a 
good idea, because the increased processing will drain the energy of the nodes. 
The first IDS described is CORE, which is a collaborative reputation mechanism to en-
force cooperation between the nodes of an ad hoc network to deter selfish behavior. 
CORE has a flat architecture and mainly tries to exclude the misbehaving node from the 
network. It avoids including the misbehaving node in the routing paths and ignores its 
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transmissions if its reputation is negative. The reputation for each node is calculated by 
implementing a watchdog mechanism.  
The other two approaches have hierarchical architectures. The cooperative IDS for 
MANETs in 6.2 by Huang and Lee implements random and fair clusterhead election. 
Randomness in the election is introduced by using XOR between the random values 
chosen by every node. To verify the correctness of the procedure, every node has to cal-
culate the same output in two consecutive rounds. This IDS is anomaly based that iden-
tifies unknown attacks, but also uses rules to identify known attacks and the attacker if 
an anomaly is found. 
The third approach is based on Mobility and Energy Aware Clustering Algorithm 
(MEACA) that aims to create 1-hop clusters with nodes that have similar direction and 
speed. The clusterhead that gets elected by the algorithm should have higher energy and 
relatively lower mobility. Mobility is calculated by the sum of the duration of the links 
between the nodes. The greater the duration is, the higher the value will become. This 
approach uses multilayered hierarchies in order to detect threats more effectively and 
tries to increase the lifetime of the clusters to reduce energy consumption.  
A more detailed review and comparison between these approaches follows in the 7th 
chapter. One thing that these approaches have in common is that the IDSs cannot very 
easily identify in case of a link failure if it is a malicious behavior or the node moved 
out of range or there is congestion that implements the delay in the link that disrupts the 
communication. This problem is exacerbated in high mobility networks, where links 
break more frequently. The frequent link breaks generate false positives and affect the 
detection accuracy of an IDS. This being the reason, the MEACA algorithm that max-
imizes the lifetime of the links and clusters has better detection accuracy and reduces 
energy consumption since the reformation of clusters requires transmissions and com-
putations. Energy in MANETs is not renewed, which necessitates the reduction of ener-
gy consumption. Other algorithms reform the clusters earlier, which will cause a se-
quence of transmissions to elect a new clusterhead. MEACA algorithm is a good ap-
proach since it takes into consideration both the mobility and energy consumption.  
The conclusions of this dissertation follow in the last chapter along with some sugges-
tions about the IDSs and the architectures. An IDS should not be too complicated and 
should also not be too energy-consuming since the battery is limited. However, using an 
IDS agent in every mobile node is not efficient considering the limited resources and a 
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hierarchical approach provides a better resource management. A drawback of the hier-
archical approaches is the possibility that the clusterhead can be compromised, even for 
a period of time until reelection, and probably during this period the detection mecha-
nism will not operate. Therefore, an IDS should also monitor its own operations because 
it can be targeted by adversaries. The architecture of MANETs, as earlier stated, is co-
operative, thus, the IDS processes should also happen in a similar manner to effectively 
detect distributed attacks. Stand-alone architectures are not preferred and usually are 
applied in networks where an IDS agent cannot be implemented on every node.  
  
 
 
 
 
  -5- 
2 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
Wireless communication and networking is a rapidly emerging technology in recent 
years, which regardless of geographic position allows devices to interconnect with each 
other. There are several types of wireless networks depending on the application, like 
Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs), Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), 
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs), Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), cellular 
networks etc. There are two types of wireless networks depending on facilities or not, 
infrastructure based (Figure 2.1), like the cellular network and infrastructure less wire-
less networks (Figure2.2). In infrastructure based networks there are stationary parts, 
like base stations or access points to which nodes can connect, while in infrastructure 
less or ad hoc networks there is no fixed infrastructure and nodes communicate with 
each other directly, while they reside within each other’s radio range (single-hop) or in-
directly through other nodes (multi-hop) when they are out of the receiver’s radio range. 
For this thesis, we will study the Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. 
 
Figure 2.1 Infrastructure based network  
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2.1 What is a MANET 
MANETs are formed by two or more devices or nodes without a central or fixed infra-
structure. The term Ad Hoc states the absence of infrastructure. Because of this absence 
of base stations in MANETs nodes have to relay packets to reach the destination, that is 
to say, each node acts as a router for the neighboring nodes. The communication be-
tween nodes strongly depends on the nodes’ cooperation. There is always the case of a 
misbehaving node to disrupt the normal reception of a packet. Such attacks will be de-
tailed in a following chapter. A MANET is a self-organizing and self-configuring net-
work with the potentiality of rapid deployment of mobile nodes forming a temporary 
and highly dynamic in most cases network, where nodes join or leave the network inde-
pendently over time. The network could be partitioned in subnetworks, as in cluster 
based architecture, which is detailed below in this chapter. Nodes could move at will 
from a subnetwork to another in the vicinity. 
             
Figure 2.2 Homogeneous MANET  
2.2 Characteristics and Constrains 
There are many challenges in creating protocols for MANETs concerning security or 
reliable and qualitative communication, therefore, they are generally designed to be au-
tonomous and fault tolerant. The most important characteristics are the lack of central-
ized control, mobility of nodes, unreliable communication, limited power storage and 
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low bandwidth. A satisfactory functioning network, has to cope with the following spe-
cific characteristics and constrains.  
A MANET can be autonomously deployed, isolated from other networks or can be con-
nected to other networks through a gateway. This infrastructureless topology lacks cen-
tralized control, which means that the network’s operation depends on the good cooper-
ation of nodes. However, a misbehaving malicious node could easily join or leave the 
network and cause a disruption. In Figure 2.2, we can see the one hop communication 
of the nodes and the middle node is the one relaying the packets. In case of this node 
being the malicious node, could tear the network in two parts. The lack of infrastructure 
also means that the cost to implement such a network is considerably reduced, on the 
other hand, it renders the network vulnerable to an increased number of attacks, because 
attacks are harder to be detected. MANETs are also prone to physical threats due to the 
fact that devices are small and light, they could get easily damaged or stolen and mis-
used.    
Every networking and security task takes place in each node. Nodes inside the MANET 
act both as nodes and as routers that forward the packets through each other. This hop 
by hop communication directly to the closest neighbors creates additional traffic to each 
node, which corresponds to bandwidth and battery consumption. In Figure 2.2, the mid-
dle node is connected to every other node, so the traffic runs through it. Usually nodes 
are battery supplied and the depletion of its energy, automatically means the death of 
the node. That being the reason why many protocols have been proposed in recent 
years. Researchers are trying to find a scheme to improve the power efficiency. An effi-
cient and intelligent scheme is sleeping and waking nodes. Nodes are sleeping or stay 
idle when they do not need to transmit anything and wake up only when it is required to 
forward a packet. However, a negative characteristic in energy conserving designs is the 
high latency caused by idle nodes, which have to wake up to relay packets. In [6] au-
thors propose a Device/ Energy/ Load Aware Relaying (DELAR) scheme to extend the 
lifetime of the network. This heterogeneous scheme uses powerful nodes, called P-
nodes, powered by external or renewable energy sources, like solar cells, time division 
to avoid collisions together with different transmission power of P-nodes and a pro-
posed Asymmetric-MAC supporting data link layer acknowledgements on unidirection-
al links. 
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Scalability is one more problem in large scale networks comprised of thousands of sen-
sors, caused by mobility and generating additional traffic. A good example of large 
networks is an urban vehicle grid, named Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET). Except 
the battery and bandwidth depletion, MANETs also face processing and memory con-
strains due to the fact that nodes are light devices equipped with low power storage, 
CPU capability and memory size that require low power consumption. In order to create 
secure communication channels in mobile networks, each packet gets an additional 
overhead, which corresponds to higher throughput and greater processing volume. This 
happens due to preventive techniques or reactive techniques. More specifically, in host 
based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), the detection of attacks takes place solely in 
each node or in the case of network based IDS the detection of attacks emerges from the 
collaboration of nodes. The IDS approaches are mentioned thoroughly in the 5th Chap-
ter.  
The wireless nodes are equipped with transmitters and receivers, which can be omnidi-
rectional, highly directional or a combination. Each node however could have different 
transmission capability, typically of some hundred meters, battery capacity, software 
and hardware configurations. The IEEE 802.11 standard, which is used in WLANs and 
MANETs, is basically a best effort delivery model. There is no guarantee that the pack-
et will reach its destination. The Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoid-
ance (CSMA/CA) scheme is used to distribute the wireless medium amongst the mobile 
nodes to avoid simultaneous transmissions causing collisions. Carrier Sensing enforces 
nodes to sense the wireless channel in order to transmit. If the channel is idle then they 
can proceed to transmission, otherwise they wait a random period of time to transmit. 
Nodes share a broadcast radio channel, which can influence the reliability and length of 
the links, can cause signal loss and packet corruption because of interference. There is a 
problem in wireless networks known as the hidden terminal problem. This problem 
takes place when two nodes, which are outside of each other’s radio range, try to com-
municate with another node. The third node receives data at the same time from both 
sides which leads to collisions. Packet loss may also occur due to nodes’ high mobility 
or fading, which will result in packet retransmissions and further bandwidth consump-
tion. The mobility of the wireless nodes as well greatly affects and alters the routing ta-
bles used to locate the path to a node and may cause out of order packet delivery or path 
break. Earlier, we mentioned the cluster based architecture, in which subnetworks are 
created automatically through the algorithm. Nodes are either the cluster head, the 
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gateway node or a cluster member, who communicate only with the cluster head. Nodes 
join or leave a cluster according to their position and because of the fact that they 
change clusters, the paths change continuously and may cause out of order delivery or 
packet loss. 
Homogeneous or Heterogeneous MANETs 
MANETs can be either homogeneous (Figure 2.2) or heterogeneous (Figure 2.5). Ho-
mogeneous means that the nodes have identical capabilities, such as processing power, 
battery life, hardware/ software, transmission range (Figure 2.4), etc. Heterogeneous 
MANET means that the mobile nodes have asymmetric capabilities, that is to say dif-
ferent hardware/ software, transmission range and rate, battery life, movement speed, 
processing power, etc. The majority of the routing protocols in MANETs assume that 
the network is homogeneous, which in fact is easier to analyze. However, in reality this 
isn’t always the case. In an ad hoc military network, heterogeneous mobile devices may 
exist. Powerful devices could be installed in vehicles or light weight devices could be 
carried by soldiers, which at the same time could communicate with an aircraft. 
In a network with heterogeneous nodes, most of the routing traffic flows through the 
powerful nodes, because they have more capabilities and battery capacity. Despite the 
fact that this approach can reduce the number of hops and delay and extend the lifetime 
of the network, if a powerful node gets disconnected, it may cause critical problems. As 
in the previous military example, if the powerful node is a vehicle, it may get destroyed 
or damaged on the transceiver and the ground forces’ communications will be disrupted. 
Thus, in a network formed of heterogeneous devices this issue should be considered.  
In [7], the authors simulated some of the routing protocols, namely DSR, AODV, FSR, 
LAR1 and WRP to evaluate the behavior of the protocols in homogeneous and hetero-
geneous networks with different number of nodes each time. The results showed that, 
while the number of the nodes increases, the delay increases too. Furthermore, the 
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) is rapidly decreased. In homogeneous network, the packet 
loss percentage is very low. PDR is close to 1 for all of the simulated protocols. How-
ever, the packet loss percentage in heterogeneous networks is 20 to 25 for reactive pro-
tocols and 60 to 70 for proactive protocols. Another problem in heterogeneous networks 
is the transmission range of the powerful nodes, as displayed in Figure 2.3. The power-
ful node A has more neighbors due to the high transmission range and therefore, creates 
higher interference to the neighboring nodes. On the other hand, the weaker node B may 
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not find a node inside its transmission range and drop the packets instead. In a homoge-
neous network, the nodes have the same radio range (Figure 2.4), as a result, nodes C 
and D share a bidirectional link.  
 
Figure 2.3 Heterogeneous transmission range       Figure 2.4 Homogeneous transmission range 
The above stated routing protocols are inadequate for heterogeneous networks. Howev-
er, many protocols are proposed that address different issues of MANETs. In [8], a het-
erogeneous AODV is proposed to address the above issues. The authors simulated a 
MANET with nodes using WIFI and/ or Bluetooth. The reactive AODV, which builds 
optimal paths to the destination, failed to create routing paths between nodes using dif-
ferent protocols. HAODV, on the other hand, scales well as the heterogeneity of the 
nodes increases and finds optimal paths with better stability, smallest hop count and 
traffic, lowering the packet delivery delays. 
            
Figure 2.5 Heterogeneous MANET                
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WLANs compared to MANETs 
In WLAN, there is an Access Point (AP) where devices are able to connect to, as in 
Figure 2.1. The fixed part of the network ensures the good working condition. The rout-
ing, security, Quality of Service, scalability are easily guaranteed, because everything is 
centralized. Furthermore, the WLAN is a static, concerning mobility, single hop net-
work, thus, devices have to be within radio range of the AP in order to connect to the 
network. Constraints like power consumption are not a concern here, because the fixed 
infrastructure is continuously provided the power required for operation. Nevertheless, 
as will be shown below in chapter 3, MANETs usually use protocols that are used in 
WLANs that allows for interconnection between infrastructure and infrastructureless 
networks.  
2.3 Applications 
The fact that MANETs are self-forming, self-configuring, self-healing makes them easi-
ly deployable. They require depending on the application rapid deployment and they are 
suitable for military applications, e.g. aircrafts, troops deployment in hostile environ-
ments, crisis or emergency management e.g. disaster operations like firefighting, search 
and rescue operations, civilian applications e.g. virtual classes, conferences, emailing, 
home automations, monitoring humidity or temperature, e.g. scattered nodes in a forest 
may alarm for the existence of fire, detect traffic flow etc. The types of devices inter-
connected can range from sensors or computers to soldiers’ equipment. The most typi-
cal devices are laptops, PDAs, mobile phones, which provide the mobility required con-
cerning weight and dimensions. 
The ease of use and deployment of sensors may find applications in hostile environ-
ments. An airplane could fly over a chemical contaminated area and drop sensors in or-
der to collect useful measurements, while an individual could be prohibited from ap-
proaching the area or would need the appropriate equipment to enter the area. An inter-
esting application of wireless sensors is the “Smart Dust” or “Electronic Dust”, which is 
consisted of miniscule nodes or motes in a scale of a cubic millimeter. A mote contains 
a battery and a solar cell to be self-powered. However, the major challenge here, as in 
MANETs, is the low power consumption to maximize the lifetime of the node.  
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3 Protocol Layers 
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is a universal ISO standard, known as 
ISO protocol suite, which was introduced in 1970’s by the International Organization 
for Standardization. Because of the different types of systems in large networks required 
to interoperate, the OSI model was created to facilitate the communication between two 
different systems by operating in a common framework. The OSI model consists of 
seven layers, the application, presentation, session, transport, network, data link and 
physical. We will study and analyze for this thesis the protocol architecture, considering 
the application, presentation and session layers as a whole, named application layer. The 
Internet protocol stack with the five layers is based on the TCP/IP model, which is the 
predominant model nowadays and was developed in the late 1960’s by the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
 
Figure 3.1 The Internet protocol stack 
-14- 
Figure 3.1 shows the network protocol layering. Each layer is required to establish 
communication between two hosts or nodes. Data from the application layer is forward-
ed to the next layer. Each layer adds a header and forwards the packet to the next layer 
until reaching the physical layer, where the packet is transmitted through the physical 
media. The process is called encapsulation. The in-between connection, as shown in 
Figure 3.1, is the physical medium, which could be cables, satellite link or in our case a 
wireless link between two nodes. Upon receiving at the destination host, the exact re-
verse process takes place, which is called de-encapsulation. Each layer directs the data 
to the exact upper layer removing the header. How exactly this travel works will be 
thoroughly analyzed in this chapter.  
The protocol stack can be divided in two categories, which are related to the upper and 
lower layer services. Application and transport layers are the upper layer, which are re-
lated to the application services. If a specific service processes data, that is to say, e-
mail clients, browsing, etc. it belongs to the upper layer. On the other hand, network, 
data link and physical layers are the lower layer, which are responsible to transport data 
from host to host. 
3.1 Physical Layer 
Wired networks use twisted-pair copper wire, coaxial cable and fiber optic cable as a 
physical medium. However, the demand for tether less communications leaded to the 
development of Wireless LAN technology back in the 90’s. Wireless communications 
use either the terrestrial or the satellite radio spectrum. In wireless communications data 
are propagated in the atmosphere through electromagnetic waves and depending on the 
transmitter, the transmission could be omnidirectional or directional. In WLANs the 
technologies used at the physical layer to transmit are radio frequency, infrared and mi-
crowave. Infrared operates in the light spectrum, just below the visible spectrum and 
above the microwaves. Infrared are resistant to noise, but interfere with other light 
transmissions or the sun and require line of sight to operate. Microwaves interfere with 
other sources, can travel long distances, but require license to use the available spec-
trum. Thus, the price for microwave usage is prohibitive. 
In MANETs signals are broadcasted from one node to every other node inside it’s radio 
coverage, which is up to some hundreds of meters, thus a node usually receives signals 
from more than one nodes. The packet transmitted and received by every neighboring 
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node may be dropped, processed by the receiving node or retransmitted to another node 
depending on the destination address stated in the network layer header. The fact that a 
node receives many signals simultaneously may cause interference affecting the general 
operation of the network and notably, the total network throughput. In dense network 
topology, nodes are closer to each other and achieve higher connectivity and may im-
prove the throughput, but collisions are more likely to appear that will lead to packet 
loss and retransmissions that will require more energy being wasted.  
Every layer gets improvements over the years, either through standardization or by pro-
posals that change some parameters in attempt to achieve a specific goal. In [10], the 
authors proposed a novel scheme called Physical-layer Network Coding (PNC). PNC 
enhances the throughput of multi hop networks significantly, with the cost of a slightly 
higher Bit Error Rate (BER). BER is the number of bits received in error divided by the 
total number of bits transmitted. In most schemes today using the IEEE 802.11 MAC 
protocol, reduction of interference is the main goal, but not in this modulation/ demodu-
lation scheme. This scheme takes advantage of the broadcast nature of the wireless 
nodes to boost the throughput. Furthermore, PNC reschedules the nodes’ transmission 
time slots to reduce collisions. Adjacent nodes are not allowed to transmit in the same 
time slot. 
3.1.1 IEEE 802.11 PHY standards 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is a large organization of 
technical professionals that specified and improved over the years the 802.11 standard 
family. The 802.11 standard family comprises of several protocols specified in [12]. 
The specifications for the wireless networks’ physical channel include parameters and 
operations of the physical layer for each 802.11 protocol. The specifications contain the 
transmission mode, data rate, physical characteristics, topology, synchronization, etc.  
A physical layer packet contains the overhead with all the information required for the 
transmission/ reception and the payload. 
802.11 
The first wireless standard released in 1997 used either the Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum (FHSS) or Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) with a 11-chip Barker 
sequence. This standard operated in 2.4 GHz frequency with 1 Mbps or 2 Mbps data 
rate and an outdoor coverage of 100 meters.  
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802.11b 
After the first standard, the 802.11b standard was introduced in 1999 operating in the 
frequency range 2.4-2.4835 GHz with 1, 2, 5.5 and 11 Mbps data rate. The 802.11b 
standard uses the DSSS technology that is further analyzed below. For 1 Mbps rate, Bi-
nary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) is used; each bit is phase shifted once. For 2 Mbps 
rate, Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) is used; four phase rotations used at 0, π/2, 
π, 3π/2.  To achieve 5.5 Mbps rate, 4 Complementary Code Keying (CCK) sequences 
are used. To achieve 11 Mbps rate, 64 CCK sequences are used. CCK sequences are 8-
bit long in opposition to the 11-bit long Barker sequence, which leads to higher data rate 
due to less spreading. 
The 2.4 GHz frequency band is also where Bluetooth, WLANs, home electrical devices, 
like microwaves, baby monitors, video cameras and cordless phones operate, thus, de-
vices could use overlapping channels and interfere with each other. The frequency range 
of 83.5 MHz is divided in 14 channels. The width of each channel is 22 MHz and each 
channel is spaced 5 MHz apart from each other. The 14th channel only is 12 MHz fur-
ther. In Figure 3.2, the channels 1, 6 and 11, displayed with a solid line are an example 
of three non-overlapping channels that could be effectively used. These frequencies ap-
ply in almost all countries, but in some countries, there are variations due to regulations. 
The physical layer is tightly cooperating with the data link layer. The 802.11b PHY 
standard uses CSMA/CA for the data link layer or Medium Access Control (MAC) to 
avoid collisions. 
 
Figure 3.2 802.11b 2.4 GHz channels 
802.11a 
In 1999, the 802.11a standard was also introduced. The difference between the 802.11a 
and 802.11b is that the first one operates in the 5 GHz band with data rates 6, 9, 12, 18, 
24, 36, 48, 54 Mbps with 20 MHz bandwidth. The 802.11a has an Orthogonal Frequen-
cy Division Multiplexing (OFDM) physical layer. In OFDM PHY layer the signal splits 
in up to 52 parallel subcarriers to achieve 54 Mbps, while orthogonality of the subcarri-
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ers provides resistance to interference. The 52 subcarriers are modulated using BPSK, 
QPSK, 16 Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) or 64 QAM. The 48 of them are 
used for data and the rest for synchronization. The 802.11a standard is not compatible 
with the 802.11b and 802.11g standards. 
802.11g 
The 802.11g standard was introduced in 2003 in an attempt to further increase the data 
rate. It specifies OFDM with data rates 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48 or 54 Mbps and/ or DSSS 
with CCK with data rates 1, 2, 5.5 or 11 Mbps and Packet Binary Convolutional Coding 
(PBCC) with data rates 22 or 33 Mbps as modulation technologies. In this standard the 
transmitter and receiver can choose from the above four mentioned physical layers and 
data rates to exchange data. However, in this technology the data rate and the transmis-
sion range are inversely proportional. Higher speeds are attainable only in a few tens of 
meters.  
802.11n 
The 802.11n standard was introduced in 2009. This OFDM PHY layer utilize Multiple 
Input Multiple Output (MIMO) to increase data rate and wireless coverage, which actu-
ally combines several transmitters and receivers placed in a minimum distance apart in 
order to receive different wavelengths. MIMO technology allows Spatial Division Mul-
tiplexing (SDM) to transmit a stream through the available antennas. Multipath recep-
tion is no longer a problem as in the previous standards, on the contrary, it is deemed as 
advantage. In 802.11n, OFDM modulation technique increases to 52 subcarriers instead 
of 48 for 802.11g. The subcarriers are orthogonal to avoid interference, thus, do not re-
quire guard bands and waste bandwidth. Theoretically, the standard defines a rate up to 
600 Mbps with four data streams. 802.11n has available for use the 5/6 of the theoretical 
bandwidth, while the earlier standards had lower rates. Therefore, 802.11n, uses 20 
MHz channels with 72 Mbps rate or 40 MHz channels with 144.4 Mbps rate. When the 
channel bandwidth chosen is 40 MHz the number of subcarriers is raised to 108. The 
processing time and power is increased in 802.11n compared to older 802.11 standards, 
furthermore, the cost of the hardware is also increased and gets more complex. 
Spread Spectrum 
We should mention that the physical layer is responsible to manage interference by 
electromagnetic emissions, jamming, which happens when a stronger signal over-
whelms the weaker one and multipath, which takes place when the electromagnetic 
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wave is reflected by objects and the ground to reach the destination by creating different 
wave lengths.  
Nowadays, some WLAN technologies, named above, use the Spread Spectrum Tech-
nology (SST), which is interference and multipath resistant, has lower probability of 
intercept meaning better security and privacy. Of utmost importance is that SST does 
not require license to operate. Spread Spectrum Technology has two modulation tech-
niques widely used, the Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FSSS) and the Direct 
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS). 
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
DSSS spreads the signal over a wider frequency band, which corresponds to lower 
power density in each frequency. Thus, the modulated radio signal will interfere less 
with other systems. The transmitted signal is the original signal multiplied with the 
Spreading Code (SC), also called ‘chips’. The modulation process is called ‘chipping’. 
Upon reception, the signal must be demodulated by the same Spreading Code in order 
to reassemble the original signal. During the modulation process, when the original bit 
is ‘0’, the resulting sequence is the SC used and when the bit is ‘1’, the resulting se-
quence is the SC reversed. In Figure 3.3, the SC is 7-bit long and in case of a ‘1’ bit to 
transmit, we get a reversed SC. According to this, the 2nd and 5th bits are reversed. In 
the case of noise that will reverse a ‘1’ to ‘0’ or the opposite in the transmitted signal, 
probably won’t require a retransmission in order the receiver to have the correct se-
quence. The receiver will recognize the correct sequence from the following bits. At this 
point we should mention that the higher the spreading, the more resistant a system is to 
interference. 
IEEE 802.11 with DSSS modulation uses 11-bit long spreading sequences. 802.11 re-
quires for the transmission 22 MHz bandwidth spaced 25 MHz apart to avoid collisions. 
The 83.5 MHz spectrum corresponds to three non-overlapping channels. In case of use 
of more than 3 systems in the available spectrum, interference will take place. As dis-
played in Figure 3.2 for example, channels 1 and 2 are overlapping.  
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Figure 3.3 DSSS modulation technique 
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
In FHSS the signal is transmitted in one frequency and then hops periodically on a dif-
ferent frequency to continue the transmission. The period of time transmitting in one 
frequency is called dwell time, which typically is 100-200 ms. The source and destina-
tion must be synchronized on the same frequency to operate. The SC here is the list of 
frequencies for the carrier. The available frequencies are grouped in lists of frequencies 
to minimize the occurrence of collisions. FHSS is more robust than DSSS in terms of 
noise and interference from other sources. If the signal interferes in a frequency will hop 
on another frequency to retransmit, thus, the interference is only for a period of time. 
On the other hand, DSSS will steadily face the same amount of interference over time. 
An attribute in frequency hopping systems is the difficulty of interception to be 
achieved, because of the frequency shift. In [14], is stated that, in practice, 6 MHz sepa-
ration is required to allow 12 systems to operate without collisions. Therefore, frequen-
cy hopping allows more channels to coexist. FHSS operates over 79 carrier frequencies 
with channel width of 1 MHz between 2.402 GHz and 2.480 GHz. Theoretically, this 
allows 79 collocated systems. The available rates attainable with FHSS are 1 Mbit/s, 2 
Mbit/s and 3Mbit/s.  
3.2 Data Link Layer 
The data link layer is divided into two sublayers, the Logical Link Control (LLC) sub-
layer and the Media Access Control (MAC) sublayer, which are just above the physical 
layer. The job of MAC sublayer is to move a network layer datagram from a Network 
Interface Card (NIC) to another over the medium. The LLC sublayer does the error 
checking, synchronization and flow control. The network layer datagram is encapsulat-
ed in a data link layer frame and then through the physical layer travels the medium. 
The above stated 802.11 PHY standards use the same MAC layer with the same frame 
structure, displayed in Figure 3.4. The 802.11 frame consists of a header, a body and a 
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32-bit Frame Check Sequence (FCS). FCS uses cyclic redundancy check to detect dam-
aged frames. The body is the payload, which is up to 2312 bytes. The header is 30-byte 
long and contains the 6-byte long destination, source, receiver and transmitter MAC ad-
dresses, the sequence control used for fragmentation of a packet and reassemble, a field 
to indicate the last fragmented frame, duration used to reset NAV timers, the 802.11 
standard version, power management, the type of frame, for example data, the subtype, 
for example a beacon frame, a retransmission flag, fields indicating a frame goes to or 
comes from the Distribution System, however, in MANETs there is no DS, a more data 
field to alert the node to wait for more frames instead of entering power saving mode, 
an ordering field and a WEP field to indicate encryption. The 2-byte long Frame Con-
trol field contains the control information displayed in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.4 IEEE 802.11 frame format in bytes 
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Figure 3.5 IEEE 802.11 Frame control field in bits 
802.11 MAC layer’s access method is the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) that 
utilize Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance protocol as the access 
mechanism. 802.11 MAC layer optionally uses an extended version of CSMA with a 
virtual carrier sensing mechanism implementing Request-to-Send (RTS) and Clear-to-
Send (CTS) packets to mitigate the hidden and exposed terminal problem explained be-
low. The 802.11 basic CSMA communication is displayed in Figure 3.7. The difference 
is that in the extended version, RTS/ CTS short control packets are added, as displayed 
in Figure 3.6, which is detailed below. On the other hand, the basic version is as de-
scribed, excluding the RTS/ CTS mechanism.  
Collision avoidance happens with the collaboration of the MAC layer and the physical 
layer. The MAC layer requests from the physical layer to perform carrier sensing and 
the physical layer will respond with the permission to transmit or not. CSMA uses the 
principle ‘listen before talk’. If the channel is idle, then the node transmits its frame af-
ter a period of time known as Distributed Inter-Frame Space (DIFS), as displayed in 
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Figure 3.7. When a node starts transmitting a packet, then the entire packet will be 
transmitted. In case of another simultaneous transmission, both nodes will continue their 
transmission suffering the collision. Therefore, we conclude that collision avoidance is 
of utmost importance. The communication is established when the node firstly sends the 
RTS packet. The RTS packet contains the destination and the duration required for the 
transmission. The receiver upon receiving the RTS, will transmit a CTS packet with the 
address of the sender and the duration, called Network Allocation Vector (NAV), to all 
adjacent nodes. The neighboring nodes will store the NAV locally and abort any at-
tempt to transmit. Consequently, a node receiving the NAV knows that the channel will 
be busy as long as NAV is not zero and can go to power saving mode. 
 
Figure 3.6 Transmission with RTS/ CTS 
If the channel is sensed occupied, the node won’t proceed to transmission and a backoff 
interval will be chosen after which the node will try again to retransmit. The random 
interval is named contention window. The contention window is dynamically chosen by 
the algorithm and depends on the rate of collisions. While the counter is set, the node 
will wait until the channel becomes idle to start the count down. When the counter 
reaches zero, only then the node can transmit its frame.  
 
Figure 3.7 Transmission without RTS/ CTS 
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After transmission the node waits for an acknowledgement that the packet is correctly 
received. Acknowledgements are very important in wireless networks due to the high 
bit error rates. Upon reception of a packet at the destination, the node waits a period of 
time known as Short Inter-Frame Spacing (SIFS) before sending the acknowledgment. 
In order the ACK to be transmitted, the packet has to reach the destination correctly. If 
the packet is lost, of course there won’t be any ACK. However, if the packet is corrupt-
ed, it may not be able to pass the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) algorithm or if it 
actually passes the CRC error detection, it means an error correction happened.  
If the transmitter does not receive acknowledgement for the transmitted packet within a 
period of time, it will assume a packet loss, the channel will have to remain idle for an 
Extended Inter-Frame Space (EIFS) and then the protocol will go back to backoff 
phase. The contention window is randomly chosen by the algorithm between 0 and CW. 
This mechanism is called Exponential Random Backoff Mechanism. If collision or 
packet loss happens again, the contention window will be doubled. As retransmissions 
take place the backoff delay continues to increase exponentially up to a fixed maximum 
size. In case of 16 consequent retransmissions, the communication is terminated. 
Acknowledgements import delays in the total network throughput. This happens be-
cause acknowledgments occupy the channel for a period of time to reach the transmitter 
just like a data packet. However, an improvement was introduced in 802.11n standard. 
Packets are streamed out and a Block ACK is used to reduce the total number of ACKs 
sent over the medium one by one. Instead of sending ACKs for ten packets, a Block 
ACK will be send acknowledging these ten packets boosting the efficiency of the net-
work. If a packet loss or an error occurs, then a selective retransmission will take place 
for the lost packet only.  
The hidden and exposed terminal problem 
In wireless networks two phenomenon could take place, the hidden and the exposed 
terminal problem. The hidden terminal problem can reduce the actual throughput of a 
network. Thus, mechanisms have been introduced to mitigate these problems and at-
tempt to eliminate the collisions.  
Hidden terminal problem 
The hidden terminal problem takes place when two nodes, B and C in Figure 3.8, which 
are outside of each other’s radio range or are unable to hear each other because of an 
obstacle blocking the line of sight, try to communicate with another node, A. The green 
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colored area is the only common covered air medium for nodes B and C. Node A re-
ceives data at the same time from both sides which will lead to collisions. Therefore, the 
hidden node is a node that cannot be heard by another node, but in case of their trans-
mission, their signals will interfere. 
Earlier, we mentioned that 802.11 MAC layer optionally uses an extended version of 
CSMA with a virtual carrier sensing mechanism implementing Request-to-Send (RTS) 
and Clear-to-Send (CTS) packets to mitigate the hidden and exposed terminal problem. 
When node B wants to contact node A, a RTS packet will be sent to node A. Node A 
upon receiving the RTS will broadcast a CTS packet that will be received by nodes B 
and C. At this point, the air medium is reserved and node C knows that it shouldn’t 
transmit because there is a hidden node and node B can proceed to its transmission. 
 
Figure 3.8 Hidden and exposed terminal problem 
Exposed terminal problem 
The exposed terminal problem is a lot different. The exposed terminal problem occurs 
in case a node is prevented from transmitting, while another node inside its wireless 
coverage is transmitting. If node B, in Figure 3.8, begins a conversation with node A, 
then C will stay idle to avoid collisions with node A. However, node G does not inter-
fere with nodes A and B. The same problem happens if B communicates with G. Node 
C won’t start its transmission because the transmission will generate collisions with the 
other nodes. The RTS/ CTS mechanism solves also the exposed terminal problem. If B 
communicates with G and node C wants to transmit something, it will wait for the 4-
way handshake to finish and then will broadcast its own RTS packet. The sequence 
RTS, CTS, data and ACK is called the 4-way handshake. 
RTS/ CTS has been implemented by other MAC protocols, such as Multiple Access 
with Collision Avoidance (MACA) or MACA for wireless (MACAW). RTS/ CTS does 
not ensure that collisions won’t happen. They eliminate the hidden terminal problem 
with the assumption that these nodes are within the transmission range, but collisions 
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may still occur. These MAC protocols assume bidirectional links. In a previous chapter, 
we stated that nodes could have asymmetrical capabilities. In this case a RTS packet 
could be forwarded correctly, but the CTS packet could fail reaching the transmitter. 
In [25], the authors simulated a MANET environment and came to the conclusion that 
the carrier sensing range, transmission range and interference range are different. The 
carrier sensing range depends on the antenna sensitivity, the transmission range depends 
on the transmission power and attenuation of the medium and the interference range is 
the distance that a receiving node will suffer from interference by a transmitting node. 
The simulation showed that the interference range at the receiver is 1.78 times the 
transmitter-receiver distance. The conclusion of this, is that a hidden node may exist for 
both the nodes, either the receiver or the transmitter. The authors, however, proposed a 
mechanism, instead of RTS/ CTS, to mitigate the large interference range. 
3.3 Network Layer and Routing 
The network layer is the most researched and the most complex between the layers and 
it is responsible for moving the packets in the network by providing communication be-
tween the nodes. One of the most critical function takes place in the network layer, 
which is the routing. Routing is required to build the ad hoc network consisting of mo-
bile nodes connected with wireless links. The routing algorithms are responsible to cre-
ate paths between the source and destination nodes in order to exchange data. Earlier, 
we mentioned that the wireless nodes behave either as a host or as a router. The second 
network layer function is the switching. When a node receives a packet, which has an-
other node as destination, the node has to forward that packet to the correct direction. 
The routing algorithm depending on the protocol used, tries to find the best path availa-
ble to connect to a node.  
In mobile ad hoc networks, however, there are many difficulties compared to wired or 
one-hop WLANs. Routing is one of the critical problems, which could fail for several 
reasons. On the next chapter, we will see that the most types of attacks against MA-
NETs target the network layer. We have already discussed about interference and 
asymmetrical links in these multi hop networks being a reason for high packet loss per-
centage. Packet loss may also occur due to mobility. Assuming that a destination is now 
in a spot that the packet is transmitted, we have to calculate the end-to-end delay until it 
reaches it. The processing, buffer, transmission and propagation delays may actually 
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increase the delivery time in a degree that by the time the packet arrives, the node will 
not be there. Thus, accurate information is required on time about the current state. The 
problem is even higher when the topology changes rapidly. The algorithm requires time 
to converge. When mobility is high, loops can be created in the network and not much 
can be done. 
A node in order to detect neighboring nodes broadcasts HELLO messages and the an-
swers received provide the information to build the path to the destination. However, 
this node detection may flood the network with high volume transmissions. In ad hoc 
networks with large number of nodes, the broadcasting may greatly increase traffic im-
posing congestion, which will lead to packet loss and high delays. Furthermore, high 
traffic and mobility will further consume energy and will decrease the nodes’ lifetime. 
Therefore, the routing algorithm has to cope with the above problems. The algorithm 
has to cope with the dynamic topology, convergence, unidirectional links, scalability in 
large networks, simplicity, power conservation, avoid loops, robustness, quality of ser-
vice, low latency, preserve the packet order, support priority, low overhead and high 
throughput. 
3.3.1 Routing Management 
In mobile ad hoc networks, nodes move at will and routing paths, which are stored lo-
cally on nodes’ cache, the routing table, change frequently. Thus, the routing tables may 
become outdated fast, if the mobility is high. In order to keep up to date routing tables 
and connectivity, the nodes have to periodically broadcast route updates to check if the 
neighbors are still there and then update the routing tables. In mobile ad hoc networks, 
there are three mechanisms to manage the connectivity being route discovery, selection 
and maintenance.  
Route discovery 
When a node wants to send data to a destination, first checks the routing table to see if 
the routing path is available. If the routing path is available, the node proceeds to the 
transmission. If the routing path is not available then the node will have to initiate the 
route discovery mechanism and find a route to forward the data. The query packet send 
from the transmitter is broadcasted to the entire network. However, the propagation of 
the query packet has restrictions to avoid unnecessary flooding. A node receiving the 
packet should only propagate the query packet, if the node is not the destination and if 
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the node has not already propagated the same query packet in order to avoid infinite re-
transmissions of the same packet. When the destination receives the message, a route 
reply is sent back to the source node through the exact path that the query was sent. The 
route reply can provide the cost of the path in terms of delays, number of hops etc. 
However, the route discovery mechanism can provide more than one possible paths 
from source to destination. Therefore, an optimal path can be chosen. 
The route discovery mechanism has to be optimized taking into consideration the sim-
plicity, overhead and route searching latency. Flooding is suitable for ad hoc networks, 
because there is no a priori knowledge about the topology, which keeps changing fre-
quently. However, flooding imposes large amounts of transmitted packets consuming 
the network’s resources. This being the reason, two mechanisms are implemented to 
mitigate the above problem. The first one, in order to reduce the overhead enables in-
termediate nodes to send back to the source a route reply with the requested path, if they 
have already discovered it. This mechanism may suppress unnecessary flooding, but the 
problem imposed here is that the route reply may not provide the optimal path from the 
source to destination. The second alternative mechanism to reduce the overhead is by 
implementing an expanding ring search. Several route discovery messages are propa-
gated at a limited scope and if this mechanism fails to obtain a path to the destination, a 
flooding will be triggered. The drawback in this approach is the increased latency in 
route discovery accumulated for every attempt.    
Route discovery is vital to establish connections between the nodes, but the problem is 
the overhead created in the entire network draining the resources. Several studies pro-
posed different route discovery schemes trying to optimize the algorithm by reducing 
the overhead produced by flooding, however, the algorithm may produce paths with 
unidirectional links or non-optimal paths. 
Route selection 
The routing algorithm has to choose the optimal path between different paths to estab-
lish a connection, if more than one are available. The optimal path means that the algo-
rithm has to estimate the performance of each path and find the one with higher capaci-
ty, lower delays, lower error rate, lower interference and higher route reliability. In 
wired networks, algorithms usually take into account the hop count from source to des-
tination. That is to say, minimum hop count is preferred. However, this is not the case in 
wireless ad hoc networks. A minimum hop count constructed path corresponds to great-
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er links’ length, which links may actually suffer from higher interference and noise. 
Therefore, link failures are more frequent in this case and lower Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
(SNR) on the longer distances corresponds to packet loss under a threshold leading to 
lower throughput. Generally, shorter paths are more reliable than longer paths and usu-
ally are preferred in the route construction.  
Route maintenance 
Route maintenance is important in wireless ad hoc networks, because of the frequent 
changes in the topology. Route maintenance is the mechanism that will initiate a route 
discovery in case of a broken link detection. The link may be broken for several rea-
sons, which are already stated before, for example battery depletion. The detection of a 
broken link happens when a node relays a packet to the destination direction and does 
not receive acknowledgement. If consecutive retransmissions take place, up to a thresh-
old, it means that the path is broken. Consequently, the node detecting the broken link 
will inform the source to choose another path to the destination. If the source node has a 
different path in its routing table to the destination, it will delete the broken path from 
the routing table and it will proceed to the retransmission. In any other case the source 
node will initiate a route discovery. 
3.3.2 Topology Based Routing 
In topology based routing approach there are three protocol categories with the differ-
ence on timing when constructing the paths, which are proactive, reactive and hybrid.  
Proactive Routing 
The proactive or table-driven routing is based on the knowledge of all the available 
paths to every destination. This approach is based on a priori knowledge of the paths 
and frequent route discovery to keep up to date paths. The advantage in this approach is 
that when a node requires to send a packet, the path is already known and the transmis-
sion takes place immediately, thus, it does not suffer the discovery delay. Though the 
proactive approach minimizes delays required for real time applications for example, 
the drawback here is the periodic flooding of the network to check the link validity, 
which consumes the scarce resources of the network; the bandwidth and the battery of 
the nodes. The proactive routing protocols scale well in small networks, but on the other 
hand, they do not scale well in large networks. Each node in this approach maintains a 
routing table of all the available paths for the entire network, therefore, it requires large 
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cache to store all of the paths. In high topology changes, where the algorithm requires 
time to converge, it will lead to packet drops before the route discovery.  
We will analyze some proactive routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks of the 
many proposed in the literature [27]. 
The Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) protocol 
In [28], the authors proposed OLSR protocol for MANETs. OLSR is a proactive and 
link state protocol, which means that it periodically requires the exchange of control 
messages broadcasted throughout the network. OLSR optimizes the classical link state 
protocol to reduce the size of information and the number of flooding query packets. 
The classical link state algorithm computes the least cost path between source and des-
tination for every available path. After the algorithm converges, every node in the net-
work maintains an identical routing table. In OLSR, the size of control packets is re-
duced, while the algorithm, instead of every link, uses a subset with its neighbors, called 
multipoint relay selectors. OLSR minimizes the flooding by using only the multipoint 
relays (MPRs) to retransmit the packets. Furthermore, the protocol does not create addi-
tional overhead by sending control messages when link failures take place. Therefore, 
OLSR scales well in large and dense wireless networks.  
The nodes must detect the neighboring nodes and require for a valid link to be bi-
directional. This is achieved by broadcasting a HELLO message to the one-hop neigh-
bors, which message will not be rebroadcasted by the receiving nodes. The HELLO 
message contains the list of addresses of the valid links, therefore, the receiving nodes 
will record information about the status of the links up to two hops away. The link sta-
tus can be unidirectional, bidirectional or MPR. Every node selects its one-hop neigh-
boring MPRs, which retransmits its packets, in a way that the MPRs will cover every 
node in a two-hop range. The optimality is achieved by maintaining the smaller MPR 
set. Simply put, MPRs are the intermediate nodes in a two-hop count path (Figure 3.9). 
The MPR set is recalculated if a change in the topology is detected, either if a new bidi-
rectional link is detected or if a bidirectional link with a neighbor fails. 
The wireless nodes use Topology Control (TC) messages to declare their MPR selector 
set. The TC message is periodically broadcasted by every node in the network with the 
advantage of the OLSR algorithm to broadcast the TC message to the MPRs. The TC 
message contains the neighbors of the transmitting MPR. Every node in the network 
obtain routing knowledge through the TC messaging. 
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Figure 3.9 OLSR Multipoint relays 
The Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) routing protocol 
The classical distance vector algorithm computes the least cost distances to each neigh-
bor and stores them in a distance table. Nodes running distance vector protocol do not 
possess information about the entire network as in link state algorithm, but periodically 
broadcast the distance estimation of the links to its neighbors or when a topological 
change takes place. To construct a path from source to destination, the same computa-
tion takes place for each link to create the least cost path. The distance vector algorithm 
is based on the Distributed Bellman-Ford (DBF) algorithm.  
In [29], a highly dynamic destination-sequenced distance-vector routing for mobile ad 
hoc networks was proposed. In DSDV, each node’s routing table contains all available 
paths from the source to the destinations and the number of hops for each one. Each 
route table entry is marked with a sequence number, assigned by the destination. Se-
quence numbers allow nodes to avoid creating routing loops as opposed to the classical 
distance vector algorithm. Routing table updates are broadcasted periodically, which 
contain the destination’s address, the number of hops to the destination, the sequence 
number of the received information, stamped by the destination and the new sequence 
number. These updates are used by nodes to optimize the path to a destination, if the 
route update’s sequence number is more recent they are recorded and the older entry is 
discarded. If two entries have the same sequence number, the route with the smaller 
number of hops is used. However, as the mobile nodes move inside the network may 
leave broken links. The broken links are assigned by a metric of infinite and a new se-
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quence number assigned by the node trying to use the broken link. As soon as a node 
receives the infinite metric, it will broadcast a route update. Route entries are deleted if 
there are no updates for a given interval.  
In DSDV to reduce the amount of information of the update packets, two packet types 
are used. The first one is the full dump, which carries all the information. While, the 
second type, will carry only the changed information since the last full dump, called in-
cremental dump. If the mobility of the nodes is low, the incremental routing update is 
preferred over the full. Therefore, DSDV by using the two types of packets reduces the 
overhead of the network. 
The Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) 
In [30], the WRP protocol is introduced. WRP is a path-finding algorithm, which com-
municates the length and the second-to-last hop (predecessor) of the shortest path to 
every destination. This technique eliminates the counting to infinity problem of the DBF 
algorithm, but it may suffer temporary loops until the converge of the algorithm.  
In WRP, each node maintains a distance table, a routing table, a link cost table and a 
message retransmission list. The distance table contains the distance for each destina-
tion from each neighbor of the node. The routing table contains an entry for each desti-
nation which specifies the destination’s identifier, the destination’s distance, the prede-
cessor of the path, the successor of the path and a tag specifying the entry as simple 
path, loop, or untagged destination. The link cost table contains the cost of relaying in-
formation through a neighboring node and the number of updates since the node re-
ceived any error-free message for the neighboring node. The message retransmission 
list (MRL) specifies one or more retransmission entries, consisting of the update mes-
sage’s sequence number, a counter that is decreased for every retransmission, a flag that 
represents an ACK received for an update message and the list of updates in the update 
message.  
Each node depends on its neighbors to create its own shortest path spanning tree by ex-
changing update messages. In WRP, each routing table update message contains the 
sender’s identifier, the sequence number, an update list of updates or ACKs to update 
messages and a response list of nodes that should send an ACK to the update message. 
An update entry specifies a destination identifier, the destination’s distance and the sec-
ond to last hop of the shortest path to the destination. An ACK entry specifies the source 
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and sequence number for the message being acknowledged. The response list is used to 
avoid retransmission of ACKs for the same message received by another neighbor. 
For each update message, the nodes are obliged to send a positive ACK to inform that 
the link is valid. In order a link to be valid it has to provide bidirectional flow. The route 
maintenance in WRP is assured with periodic HELLO messages broadcasted to the 
neighbors after a time interval, which may contain no routing table changes. In case of a 
link fail, the cost of that link is marked as infinite. If a node listed on the MRL fails to 
acknowledge update messages continuously and the retransmission counter expires, the 
link is assumed to be broken. After coming across with a broken link, the nodes con-
nected to that link will broadcast to their neighbors update messages to construct new 
paths. 
To sum up, the above stated protocols are only three of the many proposed in the litera-
ture. OLSR is a link state protocol, while DSDV and WRP are distance vector proto-
cols. Although, DSDV and OLSR cause excessive overhead on the network and require 
the maintenance of up to date status of the network, the WRP has the drawback to re-
quire four tables corresponding to a substantial memory requirement compared to 
DSDV and OLSR. All three proactive protocols require knowledge a priori to proceed 
to data exchange saved in the routing tables and exchange HELLO messages to detect 
new neighbors or to maintain connectivity with the known neighbors. In [31], a perfor-
mance comparison between the three protocols shown that OLSR’s overall performance 
is better than DSDV and WRP in terms of packet delivery ratio, routing overhead, error 
rate and collision rate, but the throughput of OLSR is slightly worse than the other two. 
Reactive Routing 
The reactive or on-demand routing protocols do not maintain a priori knowledge as the 
proactive routing protocols do. In reactive routing, routes are created when there is a 
need to transmit a packet to a destination. The first characteristic of reactive routing pro-
tocols is that nodes do not need have routing tables and do not broadcast routing updates 
to maintain connectivity. When a node needs to discover the path to a destination, it will 
flood the network with a query packet until the destination receives the packet. After 
receiving the query packet, the destination will reply to the source node with the availa-
ble path. One or more paths may exist in a network; thus, the destination may receive 
one or more query packets and will provide different routes to the source node. Conse-
quently, the source node will pick the optimal path to propagate its data to the destina-
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tion. The routing information is maintained only for the period of exchanging data. If 
the route is no longer desired and the communication ends, the node will end the con-
nection. If during the data exchange the link breaks, a new route will have to be discov-
ered. In contrast to proactive approaches, when the traffic is low in the network, the 
control overhead is significantly reduced.  
Since the reactive approach does not require routing tables, it is more suitable for large 
networks than the proactive. The drawback in reactive approaches is the increased la-
tency when initiating a route discovery to a destination. The data exchange can begin 
only after the connection setup. Therefore, the delay does not facilitate real time appli-
cations. Furthermore, the quality of the path is discovered while setting up the path and 
monitored by the nodes during the data exchange phase. 
We will analyze below some reactive routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks of 
the many proposed in the literature. 
The Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol 
DSR [32] is a reactive protocol specifically designed for use in multi hop wireless ad 
hoc networks. The source routing concept enables packets to carry an ordered list of 
nodes from source to destination creating loop-free routes. The DSR protocol uses two 
mechanisms for route discovery and route maintenance. The nodes maintain a cache 
with source routes to destinations with the routing information being extracted from re-
laying or overhearing packets for future use. Through overhearing the nodes may record 
more than one route to a destination. Therefore, if a link breaks the node could use an-
other cached route to the destination, avoiding to create additional traffic in the network. 
In DSR, in contrast to the proactive protocols earlier stated, the algorithm allows asym-
metric routes and unidirectional links to be supported, which improves the overall per-
formance and network connectivity. 
The routing discovery in DSR uses broadcasted Route Request messages, which 
specifiy the source and destination of the message and a request id specified by the 
source. Each Route Request message at first contains an empty list and later on, the list 
is updated by the intermediate nodes. Until reaching the destination, the list is filled 
with the nodes consisting the route. If the destination gets the Route Request, it will 
transmit a Route Reply back to the source with the accumulated route record. An inter-
mediate node on receiving the Route Request, it checks first its cache for a valid route 
to the destination. If the intermediate node has a valid route, it will transmit a Route Re-
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ply back to the source. To avoid flooding with the same unnecessary Route Requests, 
the intermediate nodes receiving the Route Request will check the cache and if there is a 
route record already the packet will be discarded. In case of an unreachable destination, 
an exponential back-off is used to limit the frequency of the route discovery for the 
same destination. The source node however will keep the Route Request in its buffer 
and it will try again to retransmit after an interval until reaching the destination. 
Concerning the route maintenance, each node is responsible to confirm that the packet 
has been received by the next hop. The acknowledging can derive from the IEEE 
802.11 link layer acknowledgement, by passive acknowledgement, where the transmit-
ting node overhears the receiving node relaying the packet to the next node or by setting 
a bit in the header requesting a DSR-specific software acknowledgement. In case of an 
iterative packet retransmission up to a maximum number of attempts, the intermediate 
node will send back to the source node a Route Error message announcing a broken 
link. Consequently, the source node will remove the route from the cache. If another 
entry exists in the cache, the route is immediately available to propagate the packets. 
Otherwise, a new route discovery will be executed.    
DSR uses also some additional route discovery features. Prevents Route Reply storms 
that could happen, because of neighboring nodes’ ability to send Route Replies simulta-
neously, upon receiving a Route Request, if they already have a known path. A delay 
sending the Route Reply, while sensing if the node transmitted the Route Request uses 
another route, will prevent Route Reply storms. Another mechanism implements dec-
rementing hop limit that will discard the packet if it reaches zero. Currently, this mech-
anism is used with a Route Request with hop limit 0. If the destination is 1-hop away or 
if the neighbor has cached route to the destination will propagate a Route Request. Oth-
erwise, a Route Request with no hop limit will be propagated. 
Several more optimization route maintenance features are proposed in the literature. A 
node instead of sending a Route Error message and discarding it, may attempt to sal-
vage the packet. In order to salvage the packet that caused the Route Error, a node must 
have cached a route to the destination. Each packet can be salvaged only once, there-
fore, if this is the case, the packet will be marked as having been salvaged. Automatic 
Route Shortening is another mechanism, where nodes try to shorten the route. If a node 
can overhear a previous hop transmission, but the node is not the right after hop on the 
route, then the node can shorten the path by excluding the previous node from the route. 
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An additional route maintenance feature is spreading the Route Error messages. When a 
source node receives a Route Error for a broken link, it will initiate a Route Request 
packed with a copy of the Route Error. This feature ensures that all the nodes in the 
network will take into account the existence of the invalid link. Furthermore, DSR could 
benefit from caching negative information about broken links for a period of time. If the 
node keeps cached a broken link and by the time the link is deleted, the node receives a 
Route Reply will imply that it should not utilize that link. 
The Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol 
AODV [33] is a reactive protocol borrowing the concept of sequence numbers from 
DSDV, which is a proactive protocol. AODV creates routes on demand in contrast to 
DSDV maintaining up to date routing tables. Furthermore, AODV uses the same broad-
cast route discovery mechanism as DSR does, but instead of source routing, it dynami-
cally establishes route table entries at intermediate nodes. That is to say, each node indi-
cates the next hop in order to reach a destination. The intermediate nodes to relay the 
packet have to check their routing tables and if an entry exist, they will forward the 
packet to the next node. 
After broadcasting a Route Request, the node will have to wait for a Route Reply. If the 
Route Reply is not received within a period of time, the node will rebroadcast. AODV 
uses sequence numbers to avoid loops. Each node maintains its own sequence number 
and broadcast id. The broadcast id is incremented each time the node broadcasts a Route 
Request. The broadcast id and the source IP address are used to uniquely identify a 
Route Request. Therefore, if a node receives multiple times the same Route Request 
message, it will discard it. Otherwise, using the source sequence number will set up a 
reverse path to inform the source. As the Route Request propagates to various destina-
tions, it will set up reverse paths from every node back to the source. As the Route Re-
ply travels back through the reverse path, nodes will set up a forward path. This reverse-
forward route set up is the hop-by-hop state created in the nodes, where every node 
knows only the next hop of the route. If the routes are not used for a specific time inter-
val, they will be deleted. 
As far as the route maintenance is concerned, the broadcasted HELLO message is used. 
The HELLO message is broadcasted locally to the one-hop neighbors. By default, 
HELLO messages are broadcasted every second. The HELLO messages are used to up-
date the routing tables. Therefore, if a node fails to receive consecutive messages from a 
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neighbor will assume that the link is broken. Once a link breaks, an unsolicited Route 
Reply is broadcasted to every source node in the network. As soon as, a node receives a 
notification for a broken link and it still wants to establish a new connection, a new 
Route Request with an incremented by one destination sequence number will be initiat-
ed. The increment of the sequence number ensures that no reply will be accepted with 
an older sequence number. 
In contrast to DSR, AODV does not support asymmetric links and by using HELLO 
messages significantly increases the overhead. 
Hybrid Routing 
The varying network conditions in terms of node mobility, density, network size affect 
the operation of the network. A protocol that performs well in sparse topology, may not 
perform well in dense topology. A purely reactive protocol performs well in low mobili-
ty networks, but if mobility is high the use of proactive protocols is preferred. A purely 
reactive or purely proactive protocol will not perform well in every condition. However, 
hybridization of routing protocols allows for mixing the behavior at a different region. 
The strengths of each protocol are combined into a single framework. Ideally a hybrid 
protocol should dynamically adjust to the network needs based on mobility and 
throughput.  
Routing Architectures 
An ad hoc network can have either flat or hierarchical architecture. Figure 3.10 below 
or Figure 3.9 displaying OLSR topology with MPRs, are flat ad hoc network examples. 
All of the previous stated protocols are flat routing schemes. In a flat architecture every 
node has equal responsibilities and the connections are established on condition that 
nodes are located close enough to set up a link. The protocols analyzed before maintain 
either the complete path, from source to destination, or only the next hop to the direc-
tion of the destination. Flat routing works well in small networks, up to a few hundreds 
of nodes, but faces scalability problems in large networks. In large networks, where 
paths can be fifteen hops or more, or in high mobility topology the performance is de-
graded. The links break more often than in small networks and the Route Discovery 
process creates significant overhead. Hierarchical routing protocols are an alternative to 
solve the flat routing problems. 
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Figure 3.10 Flat architecture 
In a hierarchical network (Figure 3.11), the nodes have different responsibilities and the 
network is partitioned in smaller groups, called clusters. In each cluster there are three 
kinds of nodes - the cluster head, the gateway node and the cluster member. The cluster 
head acts like a base station with higher transmission power in some cases than other 
nodes. Every node in the cluster is able to communicate only with the cluster head and 
some nodes of the same cluster. The cluster head is elected by the network nodes de-
pending on different heuristics [34], such as node degree (connectivity with other 
nodes), transmission power, mobility, battery capacity etc. The gateway nodes are the 
connection among the clusters and they are used by the cluster heads to route traffic be-
tween the clusters. Gateway nodes lie within the transmission range of at least two clus-
ter heads and multiple paths can be created from one cluster to another. The hierarchical 
routing records routes between clusters, instead of hop by hop used in flat routing 
schemes. If the cluster head of C4 in Figure 3.11 wants to transmit to C5 for example, it 
will not use as the next hop the intermediate gateway, but the cluster head of C5 as the 
destination. Furthermore, in Figure 3.11, C4 and C5 clusters have two common gate-
ways, which means that the routing flows through either of them. This approach avoids 
the reconstruction of paths if a gateway node between two clusters moves out of the 
overlapping area.  
Except the topology shown in Figure 3.11, where between two cluster heads there is a 
gateway, another possibility is that two interfering nodes of adjacent clusters, who are 
not cluster heads, may become a joint gateway. That is to say, data flows from one clus-
ter head through the two gateways to reach the other cluster. Furthermore, two cluster 
heads, which are able to directly communicate, may eliminate the gateway and com-
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municate directly. Many clustering protocols, however, enforce in such case one of the 
cluster heads to give up its leader status. The decision for the status change is based on 
different heuristics, for example the IP address.   
 
Figure 3.11 Hierarchical architecture 
 As in the flat architecture, route discovery and maintenance are based on the periodic 
transmission of HELLO messages for every node, which are broadcasted locally. The 
difference in hierarchical architecture is that the HELLO messages from cluster mem-
bers carry a cluster head IP address list and the cluster they belong. The information in 
the lists informs the cluster heads about the adjacent clusters. 
At first, a node has an undefined status level. While the node broadcasts the HELLO 
message to the neighbors, it will probably receive answers from cluster heads and will 
record the IP addresses of them. If the node discovers only one cluster head then the 
node will become a cluster member. If the node discovers more than one cluster heads 
then the node will become a gateway. Otherwise, the node will become a cluster head 
and will continue to broadcast HELLO messages to discover other clusters. The HEL-
LO messages are retransmitted after a period of time. If the node, while traversing the 
network, receives a response before the timers’ timeout, the node will become a mem-
ber of that cluster. In addition, the status of an ordinary node may change while moving 
closer to another cluster and become a gateway or the opposite.  
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Multi-level hierarchical architecture 
The previous hierarchical architecture described is an one-level hierarchy. However, the 
number of hierarchies may vary to adapt to the topology of a large network. In Figure 
3.12 the network displayed is a level 4 hierarchy. Level-0 consists of every node. Level-
1 consists of the cluster heads (black color). Level-2 is the cluster head (purple color) 
above the level-1 cluster heads. Finally, the level-3 cluster is a bigger group with the 
cluster head (red color) being the entire network leader or hierarchy leader. The cluster 
boundaries, displayed in the figure, do not represent the transmission range since in 
most cases the cluster head needs a 1-hop distance from its members 
The levels of the network can be visually represented with a tree diagram. A packet 
from C4 cluster head, which is both level-1 and level-2 leader, will either be sent to a 
level-1 cluster head from C3 or C5 or to the level-3 and network leader to reach C1 
cluster or a C2 node. The Adaptive Routing using Cluster Hierarchies (ARCH) protocol 
[35] creates multi-level hierarchies. The simulation showed that the protocol is stable 
and the packet delivery ratio is increased when combined with a flat routing protocol. 
Furthermore, [36] is also an IDS approach using multi-layer hierarchies that will be fur-
ther analyzed in the 6th chapter.  
 
Figure 3.12 Multi-level hierarchical cluster 
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Hierarchical architecture advantages 
A flat architecture is preferred for smaller networks. However, as the number of nodes 
grows, the overhead is growing accordingly. A major advantage of the hierarchical ar-
chitecture is that information about the state of the network is kept local. Not every 
change is propagated in the entire network as in flat routing. Therefore, the intracluster 
routing reduces the overall overhead. Mobility and resource management are also an 
advantage. The cluster heads could operate at a higher transmission power, while the 
other nodes transmit at lower levels. Consequently, the battery of the nodes is pre-
served, the channel is better reused, the interception of messages is decreased, because 
of the detection difficulty, leading to a more secure network. In [36] hierarchical clus-
ter-based IDS architecture, which is a mobility and energy aware IDS approach, the de-
tection is distributed to nodes with higher battery capacity, hence the battery preserva-
tion is not only required for the extension of the nodes’ lifetime, but also for the security 
of the network. 
Cluster based routing protocol (CBRP) 
In CBRP [37] the nodes’ status is the same as described – cluster head, cluster member 
or undecided. Nodes know the bidirectional links to their neighbors and the unidirec-
tional links from the neighbors to themselves. Therefore, each node maintains a neigh-
bor table with neighbor ID, link status and role of the node being a cluster head or not. 
A node periodically broadcasts a HELLO message that contains its neighbor table and 
cluster adjacency table. The cluster adjacency table contains information about adjacent 
clusters. It contains the ID of the cluster head, the intermediate gateway node to reach 
that cluster head and the status of the link. By using the HELLO messages, every node 
receives information about the topology up to 2 hops away, which is stored locally on 
the nodes. Each table entry is removed after a period of time that the node is not receiv-
ing the entry’s node’s HELLO message. 
CBRP operates in an entire distributed manner. The main processes are cluster for-
mation, adjacent cluster discovery and routing. The cluster formation algorithm allows 
the node with the lowest ID to become the cluster head. The HELLO messages are used 
for cluster formation. If an undecided node receives a HELLO message from a cluster 
head, it will immediately become a cluster member on condition that the link is bidirec-
tional. Otherwise, the node will become a cluster head. When two cluster heads have a 
direct bidirectional link, they will set up a timer after which if the link is still valid, one 
of the cluster heads will have to give up its role. The cluster head changes need to be 
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infrequently. Therefore, a cluster member with lower ID than the cluster head won’t 
challenge the status of the cluster head. 
The adjacent cluster discovery is used for clusterheads to discover all their bidirectional 
linked clusters. Every node keeps information about all adjacent cluster heads. A link 
between two clusters is called bidirectional either if there is a bidirectional link between 
nodes of the clusters or if there is a pair of opposite unidirectional links to provide bidi-
rectional flow. The cluster adjacency table of every node is updated by the HELLO 
messages received. The node receives information about every cluster head up to two 
hops away and broadcasts its cluster adjacency table with the HELLO message. 
The route discovery is done by flooding, but the Route Request packets are forwarded 
only to cluster heads reducing the number of retransmissions from every node. The 
routes discovered from source to destination, contain only cluster heads and gateways. 
When the destination receives the Route Request, it will send back to source a Route 
Reply. If the source does not receive any reply for a period of time, it will go into expo-
nential back-off before retransmitting. All source routes are recorded locally in a cache.  
The algorithms work in a similar manner as in the flat architecture for some processes. 
Route Error packets are used to denote a broken link and salvaging of routes is also 
used to modify routes. Also, route shortening mechanism is used to optimize suboptimal 
routes using the 2-hop information. 
3.3.3 Position Based Routing 
Position or location-aided routing protocols make routing decisions by using the geo-
graphic position of the nodes. In position based routing, the operating services are the 
location service and routing of data. The location information is obtainable through GPS 
or other mechanisms and its used to find the destination’s location. The location is add-
ed in the header of the packet, which is required to transmit it. In position based routing 
there is no need for nodes to maintain routing tables or to broadcast route updates. This 
is especially suitable for a fast-changing topology. A problem that the GPS dependent 
protocols face is the obstruction of the line of sight to the GPS satellites. However, other 
techniques that are not using GPS overcome this problem. In position based routing, 
three approaches are implemented – greedy forwarding, directed flooding and hierar-
chical routing. In greedy forwarding, a node forwards a packet to one-hop neighbors 
located closer to destination. In directed flooding, a node forwards a packet to more 
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than one one-hop neighbors located closer to destination. In hierarchical routing, differ-
ent routing protocols are used in the hierarchy levels, which could be non-position 
based. 
Distance routing effect algorithm for mobility (DREAM) 
One of the position based routing protocols is DREAM [38]. DREAM is based on the 
fact that the greater the distance between two nodes, the slower they seem to be moving 
with respect to each other. The faster a node moves, the more frequently the node needs 
to update its location. DREAM is bandwidth and energy efficient and highly robust with 
respect to link failures maintaining multiple routes to a destination. The protocol pro-
vides high reliability with 80 percent packet delivery. DREAM uses directed flooding to 
contain the flooding to the direction of the destination. Furthermore, the control mes-
sages are smaller than in flat architecture protocols, because they carry only the coordi-
nates and the identifier of a node.  
Source and intermediate nodes calculate the mobility and direction to associate an angu-
lar range pointing the destination. The position and direction are determined by a circu-
lar expected region around the position of the destination seen by a forwarding node. A 
location table is maintained in each node recording information about every other node, 
through which the nodes compute the distances and coordinates. The information re-
quired to fill in the location table is collected by the periodical broadcasting of each 
node advertising its location. The control packets are assigned a lifetime depending on 
the distance. The lifetime corresponds to the frequency the control packet will have to 
be retransmitted. The lifetime is calculated at a receiving node depending on the dis-
tance the packet has traveled. The nodes can modify the frequency they send position 
updates and the maximum hop count. If the mobility is high the node will send updates 
more often. However, the maximum hop count is used to drop the packet for farther dis-
tances. The reason this is the case is that the greater the distance between two nodes, the 
slower they seem to be moving with respect to each other. This mechanism allows 
nodes closer to the destination to maintain a more accurate position of it. 
3.3.4 Energy Aware Routing 
Energy efficiency in mobile ad hoc networks is essential and designing an ad hoc 
scheme primarily takes into consideration the energy efficiency of software and hard-
ware. Inevitably the mobile nodes are battery powered and in some cases, implement a 
solar cell. A mobile device has several hardware parts – monitor, CPU, memory, NIC 
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and every component requires energy to operate. Most importantly, the NIC consumes 
10 to 50 percent of the battery capacity. The power consumption of the NIC is catego-
rized in transmitting, receiving and staying idle. In addition, even in sleep mode, a min-
imum power consumption takes place.  
Energy efficiency is the most important aspect, basically because a node without energy 
will disconnect from the network. If the battery reaches a low level, the node will re-
duce its transmission power, thus, the node will lose connection to some nodes and as a 
relaying node, it will be useless for the system affecting the connectivity. Fewer relay-
ing nodes corresponds to fewer routes available, which immediately affects the perfor-
mance of the network creating delays, overloading other nodes or even partitioning the 
network. Therefore, much effort is made to minimize the power consumption in routing 
and security protocols. In energy aware routing the primary goal is to equally balance 
the energy consumption among nodes to extend the network lifetime.  
Power control in wireless networks is used to decrease the transmission power, which 
reduces the interference and consequently, leads to better RF spectrum use. However, 
by reducing the transmission power, the number of one-hop neighbors and the channel 
contention at the MAC layer will also be reduced, increasing the number of hops for the 
construction of routes and affecting the connectivity. On the other hand, if the transmis-
sion power is increased to reduce the number of hops, the nodes will have to face 
stronger interference from each other, which will again lead to retransmissions and fur-
ther consume power. Consequently, the power control and routing are dependent to 
provide the optimized solution for power aware routing. When the transmission power 
is optimized, the interference and connectivity will be at acceptable levels. 
There are three issues in power aware routing protocols. The first one is to a find a route 
that reduces or balances the power consumption among the nodes. The balance means 
that a node should not be overloaded as a relaying node depleting its resources, but 
evenly distribute the load among the nodes to ensure a longer network lifetime. The 
second is that the energy awareness is implemented only on the routing layer or the col-
laboration of the layers or the application layer. The third one is the assumption of some 
routing protocols to control the transmission power and the availability of location in-
formation. 
Wireless networks are broadly categorized into two main approaches for broadcasting – 
constant power and variable power broadcasting. In constant-power broadcasting, the 
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nodes use fixed transmission power resulting in higher power expenditure. In variable-
power broadcasting, the transmission power changes dynamically depending on the dis-
tance between two nodes. Several methods have been proposed for both approaches. 
However, a power aware routing protocol dictates every node to operate at a common 
transmit power. The common transmit power is dictated by the farthest nodes to assure 
connectivity. In case of a uniformly distributed network, the common transmit power 
level is easier to implement and expected. On the other hand, when nodes are not uni-
formly distributed, some nodes will be close enough, for example inside a cluster, and 
some nodes will be farther away. In the first case low transmission power is best suited, 
while in the second case, higher transmission power is required. 
Localized energy aware routing (LEAR) protocol 
LEAR [39] is a based on DSR protocol for the route discovery. The mobile nodes upon 
receiving a Route Request message have the choice to drop it or forward it depending 
on the remaining battery level. The messages are forwarded, if the remaining battery 
level is above a threshold. Depending on the intermediate nodes’ battery level, the mes-
sage may reach the destination or not or may find an energy efficient path to the desti-
nation. After the transmission of the Route Request, the source node awaits a reply. In 
the case of no reply, the source will initiate again a Route Request message with higher 
sequence number. In this case, when the intermediate nodes receive the message, they 
will lower the threshold to allow the relaying of the message.  
Alternate path routing (APR) protocol 
APR [40] protocol has been applied also in telephone networks and the Internet for load 
balancing and survivability. APR in an ad hoc environment, balances the energy con-
sumption by using various routes from a source to a destination, called alternate route 
set. The performance of APR is highly dependent on the alternate route set. The single 
point of failure in the alternate routes is the common intermediate nodes or links. There-
fore, a good alternate route should consist of decoupled routes. In order to create decou-
pled routes, the algorithm probably will use longer hop routes. 
APR can use proactive or reactive routing. In the proactive case, the source node knows 
the best alternate routes available with an additional overhead expense. On the other 
hand, the on-demand routing provides alternate routes when requested. 
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3.4 Transport Layer 
 The transport layer is the fourth layer of the TCP/ IP suite and it is responsible to pro-
vide end-to-end services, such as congestion control, directly to the application process-
es. The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is the most dominant transport layer pro-
tocol used in the Internet carrying about 90 percent of the data. User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) is a simpler transport layer protocol generally used for multimedia applications 
carrying the most of the remaining traffic. TCP was originally designed for wired net-
works and its performance in wireless networks is poor. Wired networks do not have 
rapid changes in the topology, bandwidth limits, errors that exist in the wireless net-
works. However, TCP provides reliable, end to end, connection-oriented, in sequence 
data delivery, flow and congestion control, packet loss recovery and resequencing of 
data arriving out of order. 
The basic problem of TCP in ad hoc networks is the misinterpretation of packet losses 
or packet delivery delays as network congestion. By assuming network congestion, TCP 
will go into congestion avoidance phase trying to reduce the transmission rate, which 
will cause a reduce in the network bandwidth.  
TCP enhancements for ad hoc networks have been proposed, but they only fix some of 
the problems. TCP and its enhancements therefore do not provide a complete solution, 
but allow the use of applications build on top of it, such as FTP, HTTP, Telnet and 
SMTP. Another reason that TCP is used in MANETs is the interconnection to wired 
infrastructures.  
3.4.1 TCP congestion control mechanism 
TCP provides a congestion control mechanism consisted of three phases – the slow 
start, congestion avoidance and fast recovery. 
Slow start 
Slow start is a mechanism that progressively increases the bandwidth. When a TCP 
connection begins, it will set the congestion window, denoted cwnd, to 1 Maximum 
Segment Size (MSS). This is the number of packets or segments allowed to be sent in 
each round trip time (RTT). The value of cwnd is increased by 1 MSS for each segment 
acknowledged for the first time. After receiving the first ACK, the cwnd will be in-
creased to 2, after that to 4 and goes on. Cwnd is increased in each RTT exponentially 
up to the slow start threshold (ssthresh) or until a packet loss occurs. When the cwnd 
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value reaches ssthresh, the slow start will end and TCP will transition into congestion 
avoidance phase. When a packet loss takes place, the ssthresh will be set to half the 
cwnd value, the cwnd will be reduced to 1 MSS and TCP will begin again the slow start 
phase. 
Slow start phase ends also when three duplicate ACKs are received. In this case, TCP 
performs a fast retransmit and enters the fast recovery phase. A duplicate ACK 
reacknowledges a segment for an already acknowledged segment. When a segment with 
a higher sequence number is received than the expected, it means that a segment was 
lost and requires retransmission. 
Congestion avoidance 
Congestion avoidance controls the increase of cwnd to avoid network congestion. For 
each RTT cwnd is increased by 1 MSS until a packet loss occurs. If three duplicate 
ACKs are received, but still the delivery of packets continues, the ssthresh is set to half 
and the cwnd to ssthresh plus 3 MSS. After that will enter the fast recovery phase. 
Fast recovery 
While in fast recovery phase, the cwnd is increased by 1 MSS for every duplicate ACK 
received for the missing segment that caused the entering to fast recovery. When the 
ACK for the missing segment is received, TCP enters the congestion avoidance phase. 
If a non-duplicate ACK is received, TCP will enter congestion avoidance phase, while 
setting cwnd equal to ssthresh. If a timeout occurs while in fast recovery phase, TCP 
will transition to slow start setting ssthresh to half the value of cwnd and the cwnd to 1 
MSS. 
3.4.2 TCP problems over MANETs 
As earlier stated, TCP was designed to be implemented in wired networks. Therefore, 
the performance of the protocol is degraded due to some factors described below.  
TCP interprets a link failure as network congestion. When the failure occurs, the buff-
ered packets at the intermediate nodes of a route will be discarded. The packet drop is 
interpreted by TCP as congestion and it will initiate the congestion control mechanism 
reducing cwnd and ssthresh, thus, reducing the bandwidth. Additionally, retransmission 
timeout is doubled, which originally is used to avoid premature timeout occurring.  
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TCP also interprets errors due to interference and fading as congestion. In case of pack-
et losses, duplicate ACKs will be received, which will trigger the fast retransmit and 
fast recovery transit reducing the transmission rate.  
Another problem that affects the performance of TCP is the channel contention. When a 
node performs its transmission, the nodes within its transmission range should stop their 
transmission for later, as discussed in the data link layer. Channel contention can also be 
caused by a large cwnd forcing the other nodes within transmission range to wait until 
the channel is idle. Therefore, the cwnd should be kept small. 
Delays in MANETs are caused due to contention in the intermediate nodes, route 
changes, errors than will trigger retransmission or multiple retransmissions. However, 
TCP uses RTT as an estimation until receiving a packet, while wired networks do not 
face sudden delay variations. The ACK may be received after the estimated period, but 
the node will already have assumed a packet loss. Consequently, the node will retrans-
mit the packets and will reduce the transmission rate. 
Furthermore, TCP performs many retransmissions for the above reasons, but in case of 
loss of a retransmission, the retransmission timer is doubled and a longer period will be 
required to retransmit. There is no effective mechanism to mitigate this problem, which 
significantly reduces the performance. 
3.4.3 TCP enhancements 
In this paragraph we will discuss some of the major TCP enhancements proposed and 
the performance issues mitigated by them. The approaches are – estimate the available 
bandwidth, determine route failures and errors, reduce contention, detect false retrans-
missions and exploit buffering capabilities.  
TCP cannot estimate the available bandwidth and packet loss may mistakenly be inter-
preted as congestion. The TCP-Vegas, TCP-Westwood and TCP-Jersey have a better 
bandwidth estimation and enhance the TCP performance in MANETs.  
TCP performance is degraded when route failures or errors occur. Explicit Link Failure 
Notification (ELFN) and Ad Hoc TCP (ADTCP) determine route failures and errors as-
sumed as congestion. 
Contention problems occur, because TCP cannot adjust the cwnd appropriately. Con-
gestion Window Limit (CWL) and Link RED (LRED) and Adaptive Pacing (AP) re-
duce the contention problem. 
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TCP cannot effectively handle the delays and proceeds to unnecessary retransmissions. 
TCP-Eifel and Forward RTO-Recovery are the two schemes to fix this problem, while 
F-RTO is improvement of TCP-Eifel. 
The performance of TCP is significantly degraded when route failures occur. When 
route failures occur, the packets traversing the route, at intermediate nodes, will be 
dropped. Split-TCP and TCP-BUS enhance the performance by taking advantage of the 
buffering capabilities avoiding unnecessary retransmissions. 
3.4.4 Ad Hoc Transport Protocol (ATP) 
TCP and its enhancements provide an insufficient transport layer. The enhancements 
only solve some of the problems or can be combined to provide a better transport layer 
with compatibility difficulties. 
ATP [42] is a reliable transport protocol designed specifically for ad hoc networks tak-
ing into consideration their unique characteristics. The main mechanisms of ATP are 
layer coordination, rate based transmissions, decoupling of congestion control and reli-
ability and assisted congestion control. ATP improves its performance by cooperating 
with lower layers to estimate the initial transmission rate, congestion control and detec-
tion of route breaks. Also uses rate based transmissions with feedback acquired from 
intermediate nodes to control the transmission rate and to schedule transmissions over 
time. Congestion control is decoupled from reliability. Network congestion information 
is acquired from intermediate nodes of a path with every ACK packet, while reliability 
information and flow control are acquired from the destination. The acknowledging in 
ATP is done by periodic selective ACKs, while TCP uses cumulative ACKs. The 
transmission rate is determined by the average of Qt and Tt. Qt is the average queuing 
delay experienced by packets and Tt is the average transmission delay experienced by 
the head-of-line packet traversing the intermediate node. The sum of Qt and Tt is send 
back to the source and the average is calculated. The rate is adjusted depending on that 
average; either increase, decrease or maintain the rate. 
ATP is not compatible with TCP and some applications like SMTP are built on top of 
TCP, thus, these applications cannot function with an ATP transport layer. ATP also 
requires intermediate nodes and lower layers to cooperate. The selective ACK in ATP is 
by default transmitted every second, which is a long period to detect packet losses.  
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3.4.5 Application Controlled Transport Protocol (ACTP) 
ACTP is a light weight transport protocol, which assigns reliability to the application 
layer. ACTP performance is between TCP and UDP, where both TCP and UDP in 
MANETs face low performance and high packet loss respectively. ACTP allows to set 
priority levels dynamically for different applications. Furthermore, it is not compatible 
with TCP as ATP does. There is no congestion window to adjust the transmission rate 
like TCP does. Also, ACTP as a light weight protocol is scalable for large networks, but 
can cause heavy congestion because there is no congestion control mechanism. There-
fore, ACTP is by far worse than TCP. 
3.5 Application Layer 
The application layer is the higher layer in the protocol stack and allows the communi-
cation between two end systems. The type of communication depends on the applica-
tion. Application examples are the world wide web, P2P file sharing, Voice over IP, 
video conferencing, online gaming, movies on demand, social networking, email, DNS 
and so on. In chapter 2.3 we have stated some applications of MANETs. Generally, they 
are used for search and rescue operations, military applications, civilian applications, 
etc. We won’t further analyze these applications and their protocols, but refer only to 
security mechanisms on the 5th chapter like cryptographic techniques and Intrusion De-
tection Systems (IDS). 
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4 Security Attacks in Ad Hoc 
Networks 
Security is a fundamental measure for mobile ad hoc networks. The unique characteris-
tics of MANETs provide a challenging environment to achieve the security properties 
taking into consideration the vulnerabilities they impose. In this chapter we will present 
possible attacks against MANETs, which can cause network congestion, packet corrup-
tion, etc. Security attacks can be categorized into two main groups, the passive and ac-
tive attacks, which will be named below and two types according to the domain of the 
attacks, the internal and external attacks. External attacks are conducted by nodes out-
side the network domain. On the other hand, internal attacks are conducted by compro-
mised nodes already part of the network. Internal attacks have greater impact since the 
adversary has knowledge of the network and access rights. 
4.1 Vulnerabilities in MANETs 
MANETs are more vulnerable than wired networks or even WLANs and each vulnera-
bility can be exploited by adversaries. Some vulnerabilities are: 
• The wireless nature of links between nodes make the network susceptible to pas-
sive attacks such as eavesdropping or active interference. As opposed to wired 
networks, there is no need for an attacker to physical access the network to con-
duct an attack or there is no firewall to go through. Moreover, the already low 
bandwidth routes suffer from noise or interference. 
• In ad hoc networks, there is no network boundaries. The nodes are traversing the 
network at will and an adversary can join the network when he gets within 
transmission range. The malicious node which have already entered the network 
is harder to detect, thus, it is more dangerous than an external attack.  
• Another problem caused by the mobility of the nodes is the implementation of 
security mechanisms. Scalability in large and highly dynamic networks is a con-
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cern for security. An intrusion detection system may not be able to determine if 
out of date information originates from a compromised node. 
• The lack of centralized management to conduct the detection of attacks shifts the 
burden to mobile nodes, which are based on trust to cooperate assuming that the 
other nodes are non-malicious. Moreover, the cooperativeness enables a mali-
cious node to launch attacks easier against the routing protocols and disrupt the 
normal network operation. 
• The scarcity of power supply enables power deprivation attacks or a node to be-
have selfishly to extend its lifetime.  
4.2 Passive Attacks 
MANETs due to the wireless nature are susceptible to passive attacks. A passive attack 
does not alter the transmitted data or disrupt the network operation, but attempts to col-
lect important data. The unauthorized tapping of these attacks is hard to detect, because 
they do not alter anything. 
Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping aims at obtaining confidential information by tapping the wireless com-
munication. The information could be location, private/ public keys, passwords, etc. It is 
crucial to keep unauthorized people and data apart. A way to achieve this is by using 
encryption at the sender. Unfortunately, when plain data are transmitted wirelessly, an 
adversary receiving them will easily be able to read them.  
A good scenario for ad hoc networks is that the adversaries have to get close enough to 
be able to tap the communication, as opposed to long range wireless technologies. The 
network becomes more secure when the area of the facilities is physically secured 
against unauthorized people. 
Traffic analysis 
In traffic analysis the adversary is not focusing on altering data. In this attack, except 
the content, the traffic pattern is important. The traffic pattern may giveaway weakness-
es, that is to say, the network topology to predict the nature of communication. For ex-
ample, in a hierarchical architecture, the cluster head transmits and receives more fre-
quently than the other nodes. The knowledge of which node is the cluster head may be 
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useful for adversaries to eavesdrop the packets from or to and proceed to an active at-
tack against it to make greater harm on the network. 
Traffic analysis may be used for carrier sensing and analyzing the traffic rate, demulti-
plexing frames and analyzing headers to detect routing information or as an active at-
tack, where some nodes are taken out to trigger the routing algorithm and obtain the 
network topology. 
4.3 Active Attacks 
Active attacks affect the operation of the network and can be detected. During an active 
attack, the performance of the network is degraded or interrupted or data can be modi-
fied. We will categorize the active attacks in this section according to the layer they 
aim, while most of them aim the network layer. 
4.3.1 Physical Attacks 
First of all, the nodes may get damaged by physical attacks, which will become a prob-
lem when an adversary enters the region where the network is operating. This either 
means that the devices are destroyed or moved outside of the communication range. The 
physically accessed nodes can be attacked by tampering techniques to gain access or 
confidential information or assist in launching other attacks. 
4.3.2 Physical Layer Attacks 
Active interference 
Active interference attacks are Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that attempt to block the 
wireless channel or distort communications. This attack depends on the protocol used 
and the knowledge of the attacker about the node. An attacker may replay out of date 
messages or forge messages coming from a destination IP. 
Jamming 
Jamming attacks are DoS attacks on wireless channels. An adversary in a jamming at-
tack will determine the frequency of the communication and transmit strong signals at 
the same frequency to disrupt the normal operation of the network. The jamming signal 
will increase the noise levels to reduce the SNR in order to obfuscate 1’s and 0’s. A 
jamming attack can be active or reactive, that is to say, the attacker transmits a continu-
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ous signal or periodically using a random time interval respectively. Jamming attacks 
are easy to launch, because there is no need for a priori information. A way to mitigate 
such attacks is by using frequency hopping techniques.  
4.3.3 Data Link Layer Attacks 
Selfish misbehavior 
Selfish behavior, as we already have said, is the refusal of a node to relay messages in 
order to extend its own battery lifetime or to occupy the wireless channel for self-use, 
while the other nodes are in back off mode. The selfish nodes mainly will drop the 
packets instead of forwarding them. Most routing protocols do not have a mechanism to 
detect selfish behavior of nodes. 
DoS in the data link layer 
DoS attacks actually can hit any layer of the protocol stack. In the link layer, a DoS at-
tack can interfere with the RTS – CTS mechanism explained earlier. Whenever a RTS is 
transmitted, an adversary may try to block the CTS. Therefore, without the CTS mes-
sage the nodes will not transmit their packets. Furthermore, an adversary may transmit 
false RTS or CTS in order to occupy the wireless medium and deter other nodes from 
transmitting for long periods.  
Acknowledgement spoofing 
False acknowledgement forwarding from an adversary for overheard packets affects the 
efficiency of communication. 
4.3.4 Network Layer Attacks 
DoS in the network layer 
Most attacks in MANETs target the network layer. Routing is very challenging and at-
tacks either disrupt the routing function or target the resources of the network, such as 
memory, bandwidth, processing power and energy. This kind of attacks are a DoS type 
of attacks. 
Blackhole attack 
In a blackhole attack, the malicious node will advertise to have the optimal route with 
the highest sequence number and minimum number of hops to destination. Consequent-
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ly, a neighboring node will use the malicious node as a relaying node, but the malicious 
node will instead drop every packet it receives. 
Greyhole attack 
Greyhole attack is similar to the blackhole attack, but instead of dropping every packet, 
the packets dropped are only of a particular node. A greyhole attack cause a DoS attack 
against a specific node or a group of nodes. 
Wormhole attack 
This attack tunnels packets from one point to another malicious node using an out of 
band channel. The second node will replay the packets. Therefore, the receiving nodes 
will assume that the first node is a single hop neighbor ignoring the presence of the sec-
ond malicious node. The receiving nodes will choose the wormhole route and ignore the 
other routes with more hops, because they will believe that the wormhole route is faster.   
Sinkhole attack 
In a sinkhole attack, the malicious node will advertise to have the optimal route to the 
destination to attract the traffic from the other nodes. Sinkhole attack however is used to 
launch other attacks. 
Rushing attack 
In a rushing attack, when the malicious node receives a Route Request, it will quickly 
retransmit it before the other nodes, in order the receiving nodes to drop any later legit-
imate Route Requests from other nodes. Therefore, the receiving nodes will create a 
path only through the malicious node. 
Hello flooding attack 
In this kind of attack, the malicious node will broadcast a HELLO message with a high 
transmission power, so that many nodes receives it. Consequently, when these nodes 
believe that the malicious node is their one hop neighbor and transmit their data, those 
data will not be received. However, a flooding attack do not necessarily require this 
unidirectional transmission. The malicious node can consume the network bandwidth 
and the nodes’ resources by transmitting many Route Request messages to a non-
existent node. The receiving nodes will continue to broadcast the Route Request mes-
sages and cause a significant performance degradation until their battery is completely 
consumed. 
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Sleep deprivation attack 
In sleep deprivation attack, the malicious node continuously forwards purposeless pack-
ets to specific nodes to relay them either to existing destinations or not. This attack aims 
at keeping the targeted node transmitting/ receiving to deplete its battery and bandwidth. 
The aim of the adversary is to limit the lifetime of the nodes and due to the nature of the 
ad hoc networks, this attack is difficult to be detected. 
Routing table poisoning attack 
Routing protocols maintaining routing tables receive messages in order to record false 
table entries in this attack. Broadcasting a Route Request with a high sequence number 
will force the other nodes to record new entries with non-optimal routes, loops or bot-
tlenecks. 
Route Error generation 
In this attack, a malicious node fabricates and sends Route Error messages to other 
nodes. When these messages are broadcasted to the network, they will break multiple 
routes between the nodes. 
Blackmail attack 
Nodes in MANETs usually keep a blacklist for malicious nodes. In a blackmail attack, 
the malicious node forwards messages reporting a legitimate node as malicious in order 
the other nodes to exclude the legitimate node from their routing tables. Therefore, the 
legitimate node is isolated from the network. 
Byzantine attack 
In this kind of attack, a malicious node or a set of compromised nodes work together to 
create routing loops, use non-optimal paths or drop packets leading to degraded routing 
services. 
Replay attack 
In a replay attack a node will record control messages of other nodes in order to re-
transmit them later in time. The recorded messages could be modified before retrans-
mission. Replay attacks affect the routing protocol because they advertise out of date 
routes. 
Jellyfish attack 
The jellyfish attack aims at increasing the end-to-end delay in the network. The attack is 
achieved by delaying to forward the packets upon reception at the malicious node. 
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Link spoofing attack 
In a link spoofing attack, the malicious node advertises fake route information in order 
to become the intermediate link and modify data or launch a DoS attack. 
Link withholding attack 
In a link withholding attack, the malicious node will not advertise information about 
links to particular nodes. 
Masquerading 
Masquerading or spoofing means that a node will pretend to be another node in the net-
work. This attack is easier to be implemented in ad hoc networks and especially in reac-
tive protocols, because the topology is not fixed. A node may move and the malicious 
node may take its place. This attack affects the synchronization when combined with a 
replay attack. Masquerading also affects the confidentiality by receiving confidential 
data destined for another node or by hiding its real identity may provide any content of 
data. Impersonation usually is the first step to launch a more advanced attack. 
Sybil attack 
Sybil attack is complex attack and an improved version of masquerading. In a Sybil at-
tack a malicious node impersonates multiple nodes. A sybil node may generate new 
identities or masquerade other legitimate nodes. Unfortunately, a sybil node is not easy 
to get detected, because of the multiple identifications. This attack affects the coopera-
tive services - the normal operation of routing, the resource allocation and the voting 
based schemes. 
Location disclosure attack 
The adversary in this attack gathers information about the location of the nodes and the 
network structure. Consequently, the adversary will proceed with further network at-
tacks by analyzing traffic. 
4.3.5 Transport Layer Attacks 
Session hijacking 
In session hijacking or cookie hijacking, an adversary exploits an active session after its 
initial setup. The adversary spoofs a node’s IP address, it finds the sequence number 
expected by the targeted node to launch DoS attacks against it. Consequently, the tar-
geted node will continue the session with the adversary, who is impersonating the vic-
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tim. In this attack, the adversary will try to collect confidential information stored in the 
session ID to gain unauthorized access or could set a username/ password to gain ac-
cess. 
SYN flood attack 
In order to establish a TCP connection, a three-way handshake is required. First, node A 
sends a SYN to synchronize with node B. B acknowledges and sends a SYN-ACK back 
to node A. Consequently, node A has to respond with an ACK to establish the connec-
tion. The SYN flood attack is a DoS type of attack, where the adversary continuously 
sends SYN requests to generate half opened TCP connections with another node and 
consume its resources. The node will send the SYN message, will receive the SYN-
ACK, but avoid sending the ACK to establish the connection. These half open connec-
tions will stay open for a period of time, but they obstruct legitimate connections. 
4.3.6 Application Layer Attacks 
Malicious code 
The application layer contains the user data and supports protocols with vulnerabilities, 
such as HTTP and FTP. Malicious code attacks include viruses and worms that attack 
the operating systems and applications. 
Repudiation attack 
Repudiation attack is the denial of participation in communications. That is to say, the 
attacker could deny having done something. 
4.3.7 Cryptographic attacks 
Cryptography is a preventive security mechanism, discussed in chapter 5.1. Cryptog-
raphy provides the confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and non-repudiation 
properties. Some of the cryptographic attacks are digital signature and hash collision 
attacks. 
The goal of attacks against digital signatures is to forge or create signatures. Digital sig-
nature attacks can be classified into known message, chosen message and key-only at-
tacks. In a known message attack, the adversary has knowledge of previous messages 
signed by the target. In a chosen message, the adversary chooses the message he wants 
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to be signed by the target. In a key-only attack, the adversary knows only the public ver-
ification algorithm. 
A hash collision attack is to find two messages that provide the same hash value. De-
pending on the algorithm used, a predefined bit-long hash value is generated. For exam-
ple, SHA-1 hash function generates a 160-bit hash value, which is the message digest, 
no matter how long the original message is. Theoretically, a hash function provides a 
unique digest for every message and the greater the length is, the more difficult it is to 
find a collision. A collision can be exploited in cases where a comparison of two hashes 
is required, such as a password hash. 
4.4 Security Properties 
Security depends on the attainment of the following properties. 
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is the property that ensures the unavailability of information to unau-
thorized individuals or entities. Information is ought to be accessible only for authorized 
use. Therefore, cryptographic techniques are used to achieve the desired confidentiality. 
A message being transmitted encrypted to the destination, will be decrypted only by the 
destination node. Nevertheless, there are possible cryptographic attacks that will dis-
close the message content. 
Integrity 
The term data integrity is the maintenance of the data without alterations as originally 
recorded. Any attempt to alter the data being malicious, human error, a system failure 
or, in wireless networks, a data corruption caused by interference is an act against the 
integrity of the system. Dropping or modification can take place in MANETs. A mali-
cious node can launch with ease a Man in the middle attack, because of the compulsory 
cooperativeness of the nodes.  
Availability 
Availability is the property of a system to be operable when it is requested by an author-
ized entity. In MANETs, a node has to provide its services, as it is designed to do, and 
survive the possible attacks, which may deplete the node’s resources or disrupt the nor-
mal operation. An example of disruption is a Denial of Service attack that affects the 
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property of availability. However, nodes may become unavailable for a period of time, 
because of the idling phase taking place to reduce the battery consumption and extend 
the nodes’ lifetime. 
Authentication 
Authenticity is the property that ensures that an entity is who he claims to be, that is to 
say, determine the identity of the user and prevent impersonation. An attacker could im-
personate a node, using a node’s IP or MAC address, to launch a more advanced attack.  
Non-repudiation 
Ensures that the originating entity will be unable to challenge an occurred action. That 
is to say, a node will not be able to deny the authenticity of having sent a message. Non-
repudiation facilitates in the detection of a compromised node inside the network. As-
cribing a delivered message to a sender makes the network more secure. Many routing 
algorithms are based on trust and reputation of the nodes. In CONFIDANT [9] Intrusion 
Detection System for example there is a Reputation System and a Trust Manager. If a 
node cooperates then it receives a positive rating, in the opposite case, it gets a negative. 
In such approaches, an untrustworthy node will be excluded from the forwarding tables 
of the neighboring nodes.     
Access control 
Access control is the prevention of an unauthorized use of network services and system 
resources.  
Anonymity 
The property of hiding the true identity of an entity is anonymity. Specifically, in MA-
NETs, anonymity is hiding the source of a packet and helps to ensure confidentiality 
and privacy.  
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5 Security Mechanisms 
Security mechanisms have been designed to mitigate the above-mentioned attacks. The 
first line of defense in MANETs are authentication, access control, encryption and digi-
tal signatures. Following, the second line are the intrusion detection systems (IDS) mon-
itoring for routing misbehavior and enforcing cooperation mechanisms, such as reputa-
tion based. These mechanisms should ensure high security requirements.  
5.1 Preventive Mechanisms 
The first line of defense are the preventive mechanisms. Authentication and encryption 
are based on cryptography, which is either symmetric or asymmetric. In symmetric 
cryptography both the sender and the receiver are aware of the same secret key that is 
used to encrypt or decrypt the message. In asymmetric cryptography, different keys, a 
public and a private, are used to encrypt and decrypt the message. If the public key is 
used for encryption, the private key is required to decrypt the message. On the other 
hand, if the private key is used for encryption, the public key is required for decryption. 
The second case is used for digital signatures to achieve data integrity and authentica-
tion.  
Authentication and privacy can be achieved by adding the digital signature on a mes-
sage and consequently, encrypting with the receiver’s public key. On the receiver side, 
the receiver’s private key is used for decryption achieving privacy and the sender’s pub-
lic key is used to decrypt the digest and retrieve the plain text. This will provide the 
properties of authentication and non-repudiation.  
The problem in cryptography however is the exchange of the secret keys over the inse-
cure wireless channel. The communication is secure as long as the secret keys remain 
secret. If the secret key is disclosed, the communication is compromised. 
The public keys, as the name suggests, are publicly available, but they require to be au-
thentic in order to avoid masquerading. The authenticity of public keys in asymmetric 
cryptography is achieved by digital certificates. The digital certificate shows the public 
key and who is the owner of the key. The digital certificates are created and signed by a 
-60- 
trusted certificate authority (CA) that will verify the legitimacy of the certificate if re-
quested by other users. In a system like a MANET, where there is no trusted third party, 
two key management schemes exist. The contributory, in which all nodes have to agree 
on a secret symmetric key and the distributive, in which one or more entities provide the 
CA functionality. Many key management schemes have been proposed in the literature, 
lots of them can be found in [43]. Nonetheless, efficient key distribution in ad hoc net-
works is a field that requires more research. 
We should also remind that the nodes may get damaged by physical attacks, which will 
become a problem when an adversary enters the region where the network is operating. 
These light weight devices can be destroyed or moved outside of the communication 
range. The protection of the network against physical attacks works as a preventive 
mechanism. However, data protection on a mobile device could be achieved using 
password or biometrics. 
The cryptographic techniques are effective to prevent most attacks, in reality, the pre-
ventive mechanisms alone are not enough to secure a network, because some attacks 
still bypass these mechanisms.  
5.2 Reactive Mechanisms 
Intrusion is any attempt to compromise the security properties described in chapter 4.4. 
The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is the system that detects the intrusions by moni-
toring activities and analyzing data. IDS is the second line of defense and in this chap-
ter, we will further analyze the different detection approaches – the anomaly based, the 
misuse based and the specification based IDS and the architectures. Moreover, some of 
the many IDS proposed in the literature are mentioned in the next chapter.  
We should also mention that the IDS proposed for wired networks cannot be imple-
mented as it is in an ad hoc environment due to the special characteristics. The scarce 
resources and the topology changes over time with the link disconnections for example 
cannot be determined as a legitimate operation, but only as an intrusion. Moreover, in 
the wired networks the traffic monitoring takes place at routers and switches, while in 
an ad hoc network there aren’t such concentration points to collect the data. Therefore, 
the collection of data from a host takes place within its radio range. 
An IDS has three main components – data collection, detection and response. The data 
collector provides an interface for collecting data, storing them in a common data for-
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mat and sending them to the detector. The detector is the component that analyzes the 
data to detect intrusion attempts that will trigger an alert. Lastly, the responder is the 
component that will react to the detected intrusions. 
5.2.1 Anomaly based IDS 
Anomaly or profile based IDS detects deviations from the normal activity profile. The 
normal activity profile specifies a statistical model describing the normal behavior of a 
user and any significant deviation leads to an alert. The alert could be an intrusion or 
could be a false positive alert, which means that the system falsely sounds an alert. This 
happens in anomaly based IDS regularly, because the activity can deviate significantly 
from the normal profile. The initial profiles are created by monitoring the activity over a 
period of time, also called training period. The disadvantage here is that during the 
training period, a malicious activity can be considered as normal behavior and included 
in the profile. However, after the training period, the IDS continues to update the pro-
files depending on the activity and the longer it continues to operate, the more accurate 
it will become in identifying threats. The advantage of anomaly based detection is the 
effectiveness of identifying new unknown threats. 
5.2.2 Misuse based IDS 
Misuse or signature based IDS compares the current behavior of a user with known at-
tacks’ signatures. The signature is a pattern for an already known threat. Therefore, an 
intrusion is detected only if the behavior matches a specific signature and if a match is 
found an alert will be generated. The advantage of misuse based IDS is the effectiveness 
of identifying known threats. The disadvantage is that it requires an updated database 
with the appropriate signatures to detect threats and the ineffectiveness of identifying 
any threat which is not contained in the database.  
5.2.3 Specification based IDS 
The specification based IDS uses system behavioral specifications in order to detect the 
threats. The system specifications are manually specified by an expert, which is a diffi-
cult task compared to the ease of implementation of a misused based IDS. It is neither a 
misuse based or an anomaly based IDS, but combines the strengths of them to detect 
known and unknown threats with a low false positive rate just like in misuse based ap-
proach. This is the case even if the behavior is unusual, because the specifications char-
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acterize legitimate behaviors. Therefore, deviations from the specifications will fire an 
alert. The problem with specification based IDSs is the inability to detect some attacks 
like DoS attacks, because they don’t cross the threshold to be characterized as illegiti-
mate.  
5.2.4 Hybrid based IDS 
The hybrid approach combines an anomaly based and a misuse based IDS. Each ap-
proach complements the other, thus, the hybrid approach mitigates the negatives that the 
two systems are facing. The misuse based IDS detects known threats and the anomaly 
based IDS detects unknown threats achieving a high detection rate. The signatures still 
need updating, but the advantage here is the low false positive rate, owing to the signa-
ture detection mechanism. 
5.2.5 IDS architectures 
Different IDS architectures exist, which are stand-alone, distributed and cooperative and 
hierarchical. The hierarchical IDS architecture utilizes a hierarchical tree-like network 
topology providing the cluster heads in upward manner greater responsibilities. The 
stand-alone and the distributed and cooperative architectures differentiate on how the 
monitoring, detection and response is done. The first one, as the name suggests, works 
alone in a host, while the latter, implements a cooperative decision making to detect 
threats. 
Stand-alone 
In the stand-alone architecture each node has its own IDS and detects attacks on its own 
without exchanging information with the other nodes. However, this architecture is not 
preferred, because of the inability to detect network attacks. 
Distributed and cooperative 
The distributed and cooperative architecture implements an IDS agent in each node and 
detects attacks locally, but as opposed to the stand-alone architecture, the nodes ex-
change information for decision making. The decision making is either collaborative or 
independent. In the collaborative decision making, each node participates actively in the 
detection process. If a node detects an intrusion, it will start a majority voting to deter-
mine if it is an attack. While in the independent decision making, specific nodes are as-
signed the collection of alerts and decide if an attack took place.  
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Collaborative decision-making IDS are more resilient against attacks or link failures, 
because every node participates in the detection process. On the other hand, in the inde-
pendent decision making, few malicious nodes may affect the decision-making results. 
Hierarchical 
In a hierarchical architecture, the network is structured in multilayer clusters with clus-
ter heads acquiring greater responsibilities. Cluster heads are elected through distributed 
voting, which monitor the cluster and distribute processing among the nodes to extend 
the cluster’s lifetime. A cluster member has its own IDS agent and locally detects intru-
sions or the cluster members could collect and forward the data to the cluster head for 
detection of malicious activity. While a cluster head carries out local and global detec-
tion for its cluster. 
5.2.6 Host/ network-based IDS 
We can further categorize the IDS on the location it is applied. Therefore, the two ap-
proaches are host-based and network-based IDS. 
Host-based IDS 
A host-based IDS is implemented on each host in the network and it is concerned only 
for what happens on that host. The analysis of the gathered data, such as log files or un-
authorized system file modification or system usage, can be performed locally or sent to 
a central manager collecting event logs. The system usage monitoring can identify real 
time illegitimate use and block an attack. Therefore, a host-based IDS is appropriate to 
detect insider attacks. 
Network-based IDS 
A network-based IDS captures and analyzes packets flowing from the network and not 
just on a single host. The packets are analyzed to detect if they are malicious or not on 
condition that they are not encrypted. That is to say, the payload of the packet is exam-
ined to identify threats based on signatures. Network based IDSs operate in promiscu-
ous mode to avoid being exposed to attackers and analyze in real time the traffic. How-
ever, this approach may slow down the network with the active scanning.  
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6 IDS Approaches 
 
In this chapter we are going to further analyze some of the many IDS approaches pro-
posed in the literature. As earlier stated, the second line of defense is the IDS, which 
monitors the network to detect routing misbehavior or enforce cooperation between the 
nodes. We have seen the routing misbehavior attacks and how a selfish node affects the 
performance of the network. Therefore, we are going to see how either the routing mis-
behavior detection or cooperation enforcement is achieved in the following IDS ap-
proaches. 
6.1 CORE 
In MANETs there is no trust between the nodes and a mechanism to achieve a level of 
trust is essential. A level of trust between the nodes is achieved by reputation, which can 
be positive or negative depending on the behavior of the node. Several reputation based 
IDSs have been proposed with different approach on how to manage the reputation and 
distinguish the selfish behavior and punish the malicious node from the link failures 
caused from mobility. CORE [50] is a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce 
the cooperation between the nodes of an ad hoc network to deter selfish behavior.  
In CORE, each node maintains reputation information about other nodes acquired either 
by the node itself or by other nodes. A good reputation of a node corresponds to the 
node’s contribution to the network and permission to use the network’s resources. 
While a bad reputation of a node, which is given for its selfish behavior, gradually will 
lead to the node’s exclusion from the community and the node will be unable to use the 
network’s resources. Furthermore, it also means that the node will not be used as a re-
laying node from the other nodes. 
A mobile node or a network entity, as it is called in the paper, maintains a set of Reputa-
tion Tables (RT) and a watchdog mechanism (WD) constituting the collaborative repu-
tation mechanism. These components allow a node to observe and classify other nodes’ 
cooperative behavior.  
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An entity that requests the execution of a function is referred as the requestor and an 
entity that executes the function is referred as the provider. Also, the entity that has pos-
itive reputation is called trusted entity.  
Reputation tables 
CORE defines three different reputation measures – the subjective, the indirect and the 
functional reputation. Each row on a RT contains four entries: the identifier of an entity, 
a collection of recent subjective observations, a list of recent indirect observations and 
the value of the reputation evaluated for a predefined function. The entities maintain a 
RT for each function and a global RT that contains the global reputation.  
Subjective reputation 
The subjective reputation is used to evaluate the direct interaction between the node or 
else the subject and its neighboring nodes. Subjective reputation is measured at a specif-
ic time from the subject’s point of view, while giving more weight on past measures. 
The reason why more weight is given on past measures is due to the case of link fail-
ures. A link break should be differentiated from routing misbehavior to avoid incorrect 
punishing of a node. 
Indirect reputation 
The indirect reputation is used to evaluate the information received from other nodes 
about a particular node. The indirect reputation only takes positive values to avoid fur-
ther attacks against reputation, such as negative ratings broadcasting for legitimate 
nodes that could cause denial of service. 
Functional reputation 
The functional reputation is a combination of different functions to evaluate the subjec-
tive reputation with respect to the packet forwarding and routing.  
The global reputation is calculated by assigning a weight to the functional reputation, 
while all of the reputation values are recorded in the nodes’ RTs.  
Watchdog mechanism 
The watchdog mechanism implements the validation mechanism used to distinct the 
positive and negative observations. Therefore, the observations are compared to the ex-
pected results to detect misbehavior. The WD is triggered for the execution of a specific 
function to a provider when it is requested by a requestor. The expected result is stored 
in a buffer and removed if the observed result matches the expected result. If the ex-
pected result does not match the observed result or if the entry in the buffer remains 
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longer than a specified time, a negative value will be recorded in the RT about the mis-
behaving entity. This will happen because the provider is not cooperating, so the rating 
provided by the WD will be negative. The negative value ensures that the node will not 
correspond to the request of the misbehaving node. If the misbehaving node requests 
from a legitimate node the execution of a function, while the global RT value is nega-
tive, the request will be ignored.  
The negative rating will decrease the subjective reputation value. On the other hand, if 
the WD does not provide a negative rating, then the RT value is not updated. In the case 
of the indirect reputation, it is increased by the positive feedback received from reply 
messages, which contain a list of the nodes’ reputation. The indirect reputation, is not 
decreased by negative feedback. This is the case to avoid spreading of false negative 
information from a malicious node and disrupt the network connectivity. However, the 
positive reputation values are decreased over time until reaching null value. The decre-
ment of the values aims at avoiding the sporadic or none at all relaying of packets, thus, 
avoiding the preservation of the only increasing positive reputation. 
Implementation 
CORE protocol is implemented on top of the DSR protocol, which is a reactive proto-
col. The monitoring takes place in the Route Discovery phase of the DSR. The watch-
dog will be able to detect misbehavior during this phase if a node is not cooperating. 
The reputation updating at the source node and the intermediate nodes draws infor-
mation from the replies to assign positive rating to the cooperating nodes. Therefore, 
only if a node is cooperating will have access on the network’s resources. Even if the 
node has negative reputation, it may change it to positive if it cooperates. 
However, the WD has the weakness that cannot detect if it is a misbehaving node or the 
packets are lost because of collisions, low transmission power or congestion causing it. 
It is also assumed that all the links are bidirectional.  
To conclude about the CORE protocol, it is a collaborative reputation mechanism that 
enforces the cooperation between the nodes of an ad hoc network to generally deter de-
nial of service attacks and selfish behavior, which actually is not aiming at harming an-
other node, but preserving its own battery. 
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6.2 A Cooperative Intrusion Detection System for Ad 
Hoc Networks 
This IDS approach [51] by Huang and Lee uses a cluster based detection scheme, where 
the clusterhead is randomly and fairly elected and is the only monitoring node that runs 
an ID agent. This scheme is implemented for efficiency while maintaining the level of 
effectiveness. An anomaly detection approach based on feature correlation is used to 
detect anomalous activity. Furthermore, rules are applied to identify the attacker and the 
attack type of known attacks after an anomaly is reported. 
Cluster formation 
As previously mentioned, a cluster is a group of nodes close to each other that elect a 
clusterhead as the cluster leader. The clusterhead has a 1-hop distance to all the cluster 
members in order to be able to detect for example spoofing attacks. The total number of 
nodes in a cluster is denoted as Sc. The clusterhead assignment is fair, which means that 
a node is randomly elected and each node has an equal service time of 1/Sc. The differ-
ent capabilities are not taken into consideration in the election procedure as in other pro-
tocols, such as higher battery capacity. The fairness will also provide a security level, if 
a malicious node cannot manipulate the procedure. In order to prevent manipulating the 
election outcome, the exchange of the random numbers happens in two phases. At first, 
the number is picked by every node and its hash value is computed, which value is 
shared with the other nodes, and when all the hash values are received by every node, 
the random number is sent. The election function uses XOR to provide the randomness, 
which is guaranteed if in the procedure at least one legitimate node takes part. The se-
lection function is computed by every node in the cluster in a distributed manner and 
every node will have to come up with the same output. 
The INITIAL state of each node is being a clusterhead with no cluster members. The 
clusterhead setup is composed with the clique computation and clusterhead computation 
protocols. A clique is a group of nodes with a direct link between them to communicate 
and overhear for malicious messages, which nodes will select a node to become their 
clusterhead. Therefore, when the clusterhead is elected, it has a list of the 1-hop cluster 
members. After the election of the clusterhead the nodes enter the DONE state. 
While a node is in the DONE state, it will have to periodically perform the cluster valid 
assertion protocol, which has two parts. The first part is to verify the validity of the 
links. If a link from the clusterhead to a member is broken, the member will check if it 
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is in another cluster since the clusters can overlap and if not, the member enters the 
LOST state and initiates the cluster recovery protocol. The clusterhead at the same time 
will delete the lost member from its list and if it doesn’t have any other members, it will 
become a member of another cluster. Otherwise, it will also enter LOST state and initi-
ate the cluster recovery protocol. The second part of the protocol, is the mandatory 
reelection of a clusterhead after a period of time for security reasons.  
The cluster recovery protocol is initiated when a node enters the LOST state in order to 
detect a new clusterhead. If a node receives a reply from a clusterhead and becomes its 
member, it will enter again the DONE state. Otherwise, it will enter the INITIAL state 
until it enters a new clique. 
Intrusion detection 
This learning based approach targets multiple features to detect deviations caused by 
abnormal activity, while feature correlation exists in normal behavior. In the cross-
feature analysis, a classifier Ci for each feature fi is computed by correlating each fea-
ture and all other features {f1, f2, …, fi-1, fi+1, …, fL}. During the training period the val-
ues of fi are predicted based on the values of the other features and analyzed. An aver-
age probability is calculated, which is used for anomaly detection below the threshold.  
The IDS may identify an attack and the identity of the attacker. In order to determine 
these, a set of identification rules for known attacks is required. These rules are comput-
ed after an anomaly is detected to save computation power. The rules are based on sta-
tistics and some of them are the number of incoming or outgoing packets on or from the 
monitored node or specifically if the monitored node is the source of a number of pack-
ets or the destination. These statistics if needed can be computed over a longer period of 
time and can detect blackhole attacks or packet dropping attacks for example. The at-
tacker can be detected in such attacks because of the 1-hop distance of the monitored 
node to the monitoring node. 
Each node has an equal probability to be elected as a clusterhead, therefore the nodes 
necessarily have preinstalled the trained IDS models. In the paper, schemes are included 
that exchange the computed features between the nodes. However, many of the features 
are traffic related, which means that feature computation cost is reduced since they are 
already known due to the 1-hop distance of the clusterhead to the other nodes. 
The result of this detection approach is a reduced CPU usage, while maintaining a simi-
lar level of detection with an approach that implements detection on every node. The 
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drawback in the approach is the single point of failure for a period of time that a com-
promised node is elected as clusterhead until the reelection timer expires. 
6.3 A Mobility and Energy-aware Hierarchical Intru-
sion Detection System for MANETs 
In [36], another hierarchical IDS architecture is proposed by Eleni Darra et al. The pro-
posed architecture adopts the Mobility and Energy Aware Clustering Algorithm 
(MEACA). This algorithm is designed for MANETs aiming at the formation of mobility 
and energy aware 1-hop clusters. The MEACA algorithm [52] elects clusterheads with 
higher energy and relatively low mobility. The mobility in the approach is relatively 
low, because the cluster formation is composed by nodes with similar direction and 
speed. Therefore, the nodes appear more static maintaining a higher cluster lifetime and 
a greater detection accuracy. In the proposed IDS approach, the energy consumption for 
detection functions is balanced in a distributed manner based on the remaining energy 
of each node. 
The Link Expiration Time (LET) defines the mobility stability, which predicts the expi-
ration time of a route in order to reconfigure the route before the disconnection happens. 
The parameters required to calculate the LET are speed, direction and propagation 
range. The larger the average value of LET is for a node, the longer the connections 
with the neighboring nodes are maintained.  
Cluster formation 
The architecture of the approach uses autonomous multileveled hierarchies as displayed 
in Figure 3.12. Every cluster has one clusterhead and the rest of the nodes, usually four 
or five, are members of it. When the first level of clusters is created, the clusterheads 
will elect a second level clusterhead above them. This step is repeated until the higher 
level of the hierarchy is consisted by one node. Moreover, in each level of the hierarchy 
the participating nodes in a cluster should have 1-hop distance. 
The MEACA algorithm uses two attributes for the election of the clusterhead. The first 
one is the mobility attribute Am. This attribute is computed by summarizing the time a 
node is a 1-hop neighbor with every other node. Therefore, if a node moves at the same 
direction with a similar speed with another node, this attribute will be high meaning the 
link is stable. The second attribute is the energy attribute Ae, which is the remaining 
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lifetime of the node. The higher these two attributes are, the more static a link between 
two nodes is in terms of mobility and life expectancy. 
These attributes are determined by every node for itself and advertised periodically to 
its neighborhood. Every node maintains a table that records these values together with 
the corresponding node’s ID. The table entries are updated with any new advertisement 
or deleted if there is no recent update. In case of a new node joining the cluster, the oth-
er nodes will record a null value for the mobility attribute of the new member and con-
sequently, the new member cannot become a clusterhead.  
Initially, every node is in the undecided state and will pick its clusterhead depending on 
the attribute values. The node with the higher energy will become the clusterhead. The 
other nodes will send a registration message to the freshly elected clusterhead to be-
come its member until it is accepted. When every node determines its role, they will use 
a registration table. The clusterhead will keep the IDs of the cluster members in the ta-
ble, while the cluster members will keep the ID of the clusterhead. The reformation 
phase is initiated when the clusterhead loses all of its members or if a member loses its 
clusterhead. 
Intrusion detection 
The low relative mobility of the nodes provides an improved detection accuracy, be-
cause the link failures are more unusual than in other approaches. The number of false 
positives and negatives is reduced in this approach, while in higher mobility cases the 
false positives and negatives are more often. This is the case, as earlier stated, because 
the IDS cannot effectively determine if the link failures are due to mobility, selfish be-
havior or low remaining energy. 
The intrusion detection happens only in the clusterheads by collecting data from their 1-
hop cluster members, thus, the clusterheads are overloaded with detection responsibili-
ties. In case a clusterhead cannot effectively detect an attack, it will forward the data to 
the above level’s clusterhead. The proposed IDS tries to detect attacks at the lower pos-
sible level to minimize bandwidth consumption by not generating unnecessary commu-
nication overhead to the higher levels.  
The proposed IDS reduces the overhead required for clusterhead reelection, because the 
clusters are supposed not to change frequently, which simultaneously is a drawback. If 
the clusterhead is compromised then the IDS may be disabled and no detection at all 
will take place. 
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7 Review of the IDS Approaches 
In the previous chapter, we have presented only three of the IDSs available for MA-
NETs. The IDSs for MANETs enhance security and ensure smooth operation. There are 
cooperation enforcement mechanisms like CORE, which records the reputation of the 
network’s nodes and exclude or ban the uncooperative node. The CORE algorithm gen-
erally tries to apply smooth operation by deterring selfish behavior of the nodes in a flat 
architecture. On the other hand, the other two IDS approaches mentioned, use a cluster 
based architecture that is not concerned about the reputation to detect the misbehavior 
of the nodes.  
To begin with, the IDS should be applied in a cooperative and distributed manner in or-
der to effectively detect distributed attacks against the network. Otherwise, in a stand-
alone approach each node will have to detect threats only by itself without any collabo-
ration, which is not possible for every attack. The stand-alone architecture is usually 
applied in networks where an IDS agent cannot be implemented on every node.  
All three mentioned approaches are based on cooperative schemes, which are either flat 
or hierarchical. The main difference is that in a flat architecture every node has equal 
responsibilities, but face scalability problems in large networks with 10-hop routes or 
more, while in a hierarchical architecture where each cluster consists of up to 4 or 5 
nodes, the nodes have different responsibilities and this approach is better suited to 
large networks. In a flat architecture, like the CORE’s approach, in every node there is 
an IDS agent, while in the hierarchical approaches in 6.2 and 6.3, only one IDS agent is 
implemented for each cluster in the clusterhead. Consequently, each clusterhead is over-
loaded with the detection responsibilities. Therefore, this difference introduces the ad-
vantages and disadvantages between the architectures.  
It is not efficient to implement an IDS agent in each mobile node taking into considera-
tion that the resources in MANETs are limited and the first aim is to preserve power. 
The power consumption mainly stems from the transmissions and receptions. However, 
the IDS detection mechanism consumes significant resources for each node running it. 
The first advantage of the hierarchical architecture is the reduced resource consumption, 
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because it implements fewer IDS agents and reduces the overhead created by flat rout-
ing protocols, while maintaining some information local about the state of the network. 
Every cluster member forwards its data to the clusterhead for threat detection, which 
creates additional intracluster overhead. 
The MEACA algorithm creates clusters with nodes moving to the same direction with 
similar speed to reduce energy consumption. Basically, the low mobility will reduce 
processing and transmissions, because the clusters’ reformation will be infrequent. The 
higher the mobility, the more often the links will break. In the 6.2 approach, the CPU 
usage is reduced by 29 percent when the mobility is low. The decrease is significant, but 
the MEACA approach is more power efficient since the algorithm is more suitable for 
MANETs, especially in high mobility networks. 
Unfortunately, both the hierarchical approaches face the same problem by maintaining a 
single clusterhead for every cluster running an IDS agent; they are exposed to the possi-
bility that the clusterhead can be compromised. The single point of failure is not wel-
comed if we need to secure the network. A solution to that could be a second IDS agent 
per cluster, but the processing power will be doubled for the IDS functions per cluster. 
Nevertheless, the 6.2 approach is more robust in terms of the fixed clusterhead lifetime 
and the randomness introduced. The randomness of the election and the reelection after 
a fixed period of time ensures that if a malicious node is elected as clusterhead, it will 
serve only for this period and afterwards it will hand over its role. On the other hand, 
the 6.3 approach will not reelect clusterheads frequently in an attempt to reduce the 
overhead created by the election phase. The election phase can be manipulated in some 
approaches, which depends on different heuristics, like transmission power, mobility, 
battery capacity, etc., as in the MEACA approach. Since every node broadcasts for itself 
the energy attribute that matters in the election procedure, the outcome of the election 
can be affected by a malicious node. The advertisements could be fake in order the ma-
licious node to get elected and since the lifetime of a cluster is supposed to be main-
tained for as long as possible up to a limit, it will significantly affect the performance of 
the specific cluster.  
In MEACA, the average lifetime of a clusterhead or a membership is increased as the 
network grows and the algorithm continues to run, which means that the clusters are 
more stable and the algorithm will achieve an optimal lifetime. In other algorithms, the 
early reformation of clusters costs further energy consumption. Except the time bound, 
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the MEACA algorithm reforms a cluster if the energy limits are reached. Taking into 
consideration that the clusterhead is overloaded, its resources will be depleted sooner 
than its member nodes. Therefore, the distribution of the detection load is based on the 
nodes’ remaining energy, which makes more efficient and fair use of the remaining en-
ergy.    
Since the second approach is able to detect selfishness and denial-of-service attacks 
with a detection rate of 98 percent and 0.89 false alarm rate, which statistics arise from 
simulations, there is no doubt that the approach should be preferred over the CORE al-
gorithm. The CORE algorithm mainly tries to identify selfish behavior and denial-of-
service attacks, but fails to identify other types of attacks, which leaves CORE out of 
the competition. 
An IDS is an extension of the routing algorithm and requires the best foundations possi-
ble. The IDS based on MEACA algorithm is an overall better approach. First of all, it 
takes into consideration the mobility and the energy of the nodes to improve detection 
accuracy and reduce energy consumption, which energy is not renewed and has to be 
preserved. The detection accuracy is not affected as it happens in other approaches by 
the mobility, because the nodes inside a cluster seem to be static or move with relatively 
low speed. The low mobility equals to low false positives since the links break rarely 
due to mobility. We should also remember that since the mobility attribute counts the 
lifetime of a link between two nodes, a new member of a cluster cannot become the 
clusterhead, which will provide a more secure approach. Furthermore, the 1-hop dis-
tance in each level of the hierarchy minimizes the communication overhead among the 
nodes. The IDS also targets at reducing the data transmitted to higher levels of the hier-
archy for detection purposes in order to reduce the bandwidth consumption.  
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8 Conclusions 
Wireless communications and networking is a rapidly emerging technology in recent 
years due to the ease of use and transportation of light weight mobile devices. There are 
several types of wireless networks developed, however, in this thesis we have seen a 
thorough analysis on how Mobile Ad Hoc Networks operate. MANETs are multi-hop 
infrastructureless networks with the potential to interconnect with infrastructure based 
networks. The communication among the nodes happens by relaying the packets 
through consecutive nodes from a source to the destination. Furthermore, MANETs are 
self-organizing, self-configuring and self-healing networks with a great potential of rap-
id deployment since there is no need for fixed infrastructure.  
The main characteristics of MANETs are lack of centralized control, mobility of nodes, 
unreliable communication, limited power storage, low bandwidth, CPU capabilities and 
memory size. Therefore, in order to provide a solution, it is important to take into con-
sideration not only these characteristics, but also the security of the network. There are 
many types of attacks against wireless networks and especially for MANETs, which 
already have been described in the 4th chapter. Since the nodes depend on the coopera-
tion of each other to transmit and receive packets, it is easier for adversaries to attack 
the network, because of the lack of centralized control. Under these circumstances, In-
trusion Detection Systems have been proposed to solve cooperation problems, like 
CORE algorithm, detect malicious behavior and the identity of the attacker in order to 
defend effectively against misbehavior. 
MANETs initially received an interest for development for military applications, but 
they can be useful in every day civilian applications. Therefore, they received a growing 
interest for research and optimization. Every layer of the widely used TCP/ IP stack is 
being researched and improved over the years, but the MANET field requires further 
research for protocols that will at first take into consideration the uniqueness of MA-
NETs. We have seen that there are protocols proposed that outperform TCP for exam-
ple, but they are not widely used. One reason is that TCP allows the interconnection of 
the network with the outside world, while ATP, that we referred to in 3.4.4 chapter, is 
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not compatible with the TCP based networks. The TCP was developed to be used in 
wired networks and the consequence of using it in wireless environments was further 
described; TCP is not able to distinguish a broken link or congestion between two hosts, 
since in wired networks and WLANs the link from a router to a host has a one-hop dis-
tance. Nevertheless, TCP enhancements has been proposed to solve some issues of the 
original protocol, but they don’t provide a complete solution.  
Except the transport layer performance, the lower layers also use WLAN technology. 
The IEEE 802.11 PHY and MAC layers used in MANETs struggle with collisions due 
to interference that will reduce the network’s throughput and implement mechanisms, 
like RTS/ CTS, to minimize the problem from occurring. Interference can be avoided by 
using techniques like OFDM in the physical layer. 
The most important and most researched layer however is the network layer, where the 
routing takes place. The challenge in this layer is the construction and maintenance of 
routes from source to destination. We have described the routing approaches, which are 
proactive, reactive and hybrid. There are main differences in these approaches. In proac-
tive routing, the protocols require up to date routes to every destination, which provides 
the advantage of lower delays making the approach more suitable for real time applica-
tions, but require memory for the routing tables and in large networks the requirement is 
increased making the approach inefficient. Moreover, the route updating requires peri-
odic broadcasting of HELLO messages, which consumes the scarce resources of the 
network; both bandwidth and energy of the nodes. In reactive routing on the other hand, 
routes are created only when requested and maintained only for the period required to 
exchange data. The route construction still requires broadcasting to detect the destina-
tion, but the overall network overhead is reduced compared to proactive routing. There-
fore, reactive routing is more suitable for large networks, but the route discovery intro-
duces higher latency until the packet is transmitted after the discovery. The hybrid ap-
proach uses a combination of the strengths of the two approaches in a common frame-
work. 
The proactive and reactive approaches and the protocols described, such as OLSR and 
DSR have a flat architecture, in which every node has equal responsibilities. However, a 
hierarchical architecture provides different roles for the nodes and an effective way to 
group them in clusters to solve the scalability problem in large networks, where the 
overhead is growing as the number of the nodes grows. On the other hand, this architec-
  -79- 
ture is not preferred for small networks, because it increases the complexity. The differ-
ent roles in the architecture will allow for the clusterheads to audit its cluster members, 
while being the only IDS agent inside a cluster that gathers information from its mem-
bers to detect threats. This approach is also more power efficient, since each IDS agent 
implemented requires a significant amount of power to operate. Power preservation is 
critical in MANETs, basically because a node without energy will disconnect from the 
network affecting the connectivity, which will overload other nodes. Therefore, many 
routing schemes have as their first aim the power efficiency to extend the network’s 
lifetime. Actually, the transmission power, the overload with responsibilities and packet 
relaying for each node has to be balanced in order to extend the network’s lifetime. 
IDS is a reactive mechanism that monitors activities and analyzes data. However, there 
are also preventive mechanisms to be used to enhance the security, such as authentica-
tion and encryption, which will not eliminate the attacks. The IDSs complement the 
prevention mechanisms since insider attacks for example cannot be prevented, but both 
require processing and consume energy when implemented. Therefore, using both 
mechanisms at the same time may be inefficient because of the resource constrains. A 
more comprehensive study is required to provide a better strategy. Although a good im-
plementation may deter adversaries from attempting to attack a network. 
Furthermore, using authentication in MANETs may be required in some cases to raise 
the security level if suspicious activity is detected. However, a challenge in MANETs is 
the exchange of cryptographic keys over an insecure channel, since mobile nodes can be 
compromised.  
The IDS cannot very easily distinguish the activity between intrusion and legitimate be-
havior if there is a link failure, because of the dynamic environment, which is even 
worse in high mobility cases. The IDS approaches used are anomaly based, misuse 
based and specification based. Each of them has its advantages and disadvantages and 
should be considered on implementation based on the requirements. Misuse based for 
example does not suit to MANETs since the databases require updating for more recent 
attacks, but the lifetime of the network is limited by its nodes’ battery capacity. On the 
other hand, an anomaly based IDS in a high mobility environment generates many false 
positives, but it suits better as an approach since the technology is relatively new and 
the vulnerabilities are not totally known. Unfortunately, when implementing an anoma-
ly based IDS, a malicious activity during the training period can be included as legiti-
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mate. Thus, an offline training period may be used before the actual implementation. 
Obviously, a combination that detects both known and unknown attacks is a better ap-
proach to increase the effectiveness. Moreover, the hybrid approach will have low false 
positive rate, as the anomaly based IDS does and it will also require signature updating 
periodically. 
An IDS approach should provide high security, require low bandwidth, should be easy 
to set up and consider the characteristics of the mobile nodes. Except the attacks de-
scribed that aim at disrupting the communications, an adversary may target the IDS. 
Consequently, the IDS should also monitor its own operations.  
A distributed and cooperative or hierarchical architecture should be preferred for MA-
NETs since they are based on cooperation between the nodes. The decision making in a 
distributed and cooperative architecture is either collaborative or independent. In col-
laborative decision making, every node will participate in the detection process, which 
is more resilient against attacks. On the other hand, in the independent decision making, 
some nodes will collect the data for analysis, which process could be easier manipulated 
if malicious nodes take part in it. In a hierarchical architecture, the clusterheads get 
elected to monitor their cluster and collect information from its members to detect mis-
behavior. 
The first of the three IDS approaches described in the 6th chapter is CORE, which is a 
collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce cooperation between the nodes of an ad 
hoc network to deter selfish behavior. However, CORE mainly tries to ban a selfish 
node from the network, which is not enough to achieve higher security level. The other 
two IDS approaches are hierarchical based. The IDS approach by Huang and Lee ran-
domly and fairly elects the clusterheads, while the election phase cannot be manipulated 
if at least one legitimate node takes part. This anomaly detection approach is based on 
feature correlation to detect anomalous activity and applies rules to identify the attacker 
and the attack type of known attacks if an anomaly is reported. The rules are based on 
statistics like the number of incoming or outgoing packets on or from the monitored 
node and most of them are traffic related. The last IDS approach by Eleni Darra et al. is 
based on MEACA algorithm aiming at mobility and energy aware 1-hop clusters. The 
nodes inside a cluster maintain a similar direction and speed to achieve greater cluster 
lifetime and detection accuracy, which will also decrease the power consumption. This 
  -81- 
approach will also generate lower rate of false positives because of greater link dura-
tion. 
We compared the three IDS approaches and came to the conclusion that the approach 
by Darra et al. is overall better. CORE implements an IDS agent on every node, while 
the other two approaches implement one on every clusterhead, thus, reducing the energy 
consumption. The clusterheads may be overloaded by the detection responsibilities, but 
with correct load distribution the nodes’ lifetime is extended. The advantage of the last 
approach is the relatively low mobility of the nodes, which will require to reform the 
clusters less often and as a consequence will reduce CPU usage and transmissions. 
These IDS approaches may not be the best approaches available at the moment, howev-
er, not only the IDS approaches require further research to get improved, but also the 
batteries used. A battery improvement could save space and an increase in capacity will 
significantly increase the lifetime of the mobile devices. At last, an IDS will be more 
effective if the foundations are stronger. As we have stated before, the TCP/IP protocol 
stack does not suit the characteristics of the ad hoc networks, but it is a solution for 
now. 
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